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Natural disasters present significant threats to the infrastructure, economy, and most 
importantly, people. Land-use planning is fundamental to post-disaster management and the 
effects are often reflected in the efficiency of the policies and regulations in place. Post-disaster 
management in Japan is arguably regarded as the state of art, and this research seeks to evaluate 
the planning frameworks and policies that were developed in response to the 2011 Earthquake 
and Tsunami in Tōhoku, Japan. Disaster management comes in four stages: Mitigation, 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery. Mitigation measures can include a soft or hard 
approach. A softer approach can include maintaining the protective natural features such as 
sand dunes, wetlands and forests. A harder approach ranges from building retaining walls on 
hillslopes to sea walls in the coastal environments. Preparedness on the other hand, include 
educating the communities in case of an emergency; and responses to a disaster are often short-
term measures such as providing food and water. This research intends to focus on the final 
stage of disaster management- recovery. The recovery stage involves responses to not just the 
physical destruction, but also the social and economic repercussions from natural disasters. 
This requires major financial and scientific inputs from a range of sectors, including the 
national government. A comparison of the disaster management frameworks between Japan 
and New Zealand is carried out to determine whether these policies have been effective in 
practice and to identify where improvements can be made to disaster management in New 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Human activities increase the risk of disasters from natural hazards. Climate change amplifies 
the frequency and probability of these events, and poor land use choices, for example, could 
exacerbate these effects and turn it into a catastrophe (Keller and DeVecchio, 2015). Alongside 
the linkages between natural hazards, this presents significant threats to the infrastructure, 
economy, and most importantly people. This all comes down to land-use planning and the 
effects are often reflected in the efficiency of the policies and regulations in place (Keller and 
DeVeccio, 2015). 
 
Disaster management comes in four stages- Mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery 
(Asghar et al., 2006). Mitigation measures can include a soft or hard approach. A softer 
approach can include maintaining the protective natural features such as sand dunes, wetlands 
and forests. A harder approach ranges from building retaining walls on hillslopes to sea walls 
in the coastal environments (Roggema and Yan, 2017). Preparedness on the other hand, include 
educating the communities in case of an emergency; and response to a disaster are often short-
term measures such as providing food and water (MCDEM, 2019). 
 
This research intends to focus on the final stage of disaster management- Recovery. The 
recovery stage involves responses to not just the physical destruction, but also the social and 
economic repercussions from the natural disasters. This requires major financial and scientific 
inputs from a range of sectors, including the national government (MCDEM, 2019). 
 
Japan is arguably regarded as the pioneer in disaster management. A Comparison between the 
recovery models in Japan and New Zealand on the national, regional and local scale would 
contribute to creating a more resilient community. 
 
Research scope  
 
In order to contextualise and provide a comparative narrative, this research consists of an 
international and local scale examination on the post-disaster recovery planning. The concept 
surrounding disaster recovery planning will be explored through a review of the literature, 
policy and planning documents in place. This creates a theoretical framework and allows an 
in-depth understanding of the values of the post-disaster recovery environment and how they 
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are reflected in the legislative environment. This is highly valuable in evaluating the post-
disaster recovery frameworks in Japan and New Zealand. On an international scale, a case 
study of the post-disaster recovery efforts in Tōhoku was conducted to demonstrate their 
approach to disaster management. In addition, on a local scale, a case study on examining the 
post-disaster recovery efforts in Kaikōura was carried out in order to compare and contrast the 
approaches between the regions. This research seeks to evaluate the two case studies and by 
identifying the gaps and challenges, and thus, contributing to the understanding of post-disaster 
management from the lessons learned from the two events.       
 
Research questions and aims  
 
The overall aim of the project is evaluating disaster planning frameworks and policies in Japan 
and New Zealand to identify whether improvements can be made to disaster management in 
New Zealand. To achieve the aim, this study will answer the following questions:  
 
1. Is post-disaster management in Japan the state of the art? 
2. What are the gaps and challenges of post-disaster recovery management? Are there 
ways through which they could be filled?  
3. What is the best step forward to managing post-disaster recovery efforts?   
 
All three questions are informed by primary research consisting of a paper-based review, site 
observations and key informant interviews. This involves collecting primary data and analysing 
the planning environment in the Tōhoku and Kaikōura context. This investigation will explore 
the approaches taken to manage post-disaster recovery in Tōhoku and Kaikōura. The findings 
of these questions will provide useful insights into post-disaster recovery management in each 
region, thus, allowing an assessment of the recovery frameworks in place. From there, 




Thesis structure  
 
This thesis is presented in a linear structure. The topics are initially explored at the macro level, 
which are then funnelled down into the focus and outcomes.  
 
The theoretical review relevant to this study are discussed in Chapter 2, where it illustrates the 
main components of post-disaster recovery and their influence on the development of this 
research.  
 
Chapter 3 presents an assessment of the policies and planning documents in the Tōhoku and 
Kaikōura region.  
 
Chapter 4 outlines and discusses the methodology utilised in this research. Data was obtained 
through qualitative research methods and included several key informant interviews, site 
observations and paper-based review.  
 
Chapter 5 contains the results of the research around the Tōhoku and Kaikōura region. This 
chapter is organised into themes based on findings and observations made while in the field.    
 
Chapter 6 comprises a discussion of the findings with reference to the paper-based review. The 
chapter provides an interpretation and implications of the findings and seeks to address the 
research questions proposed for the study.  
 
Chapter 7 presents the concluding remarks of this research on the implications of the post-




Chapter 2: Theoretical Review  
 
This chapter seeks to introduce the key concepts surrounding post-disaster recovery process on 
which this study will be focussed.  The first section will introduce the concepts of post-disaster 
recovery as a whole. The following sections explore post-disaster recovery at a local level with 
regard to the ideas of resilience, community participation, collaboration, resource availability, 
awareness and the implications of disaster waste. Figure 2-1 below shows the overall structure 
of the theoretical review.   
 
 
Figure 2-1 This diagram illustrates the structure of the literature review. This first section discusses 
the overarching post-disaster recovery framework, and the following section narrows down and 
explores post-disaster recovery at a local level.   
 
Introduction to post-disaster recovery  
 
Disasters disrupt the functioning of a community and affect the social, economic and 
environmental spheres of a region (Becken and Hughney, 2013). Hazard analysis and 
vulnerability assessments provide a platform to restore the status quo post-disaster as quickly 
and as efficient as possible (Oloruntoba et al., 2017). The assessments can include 
environmental, economic and social factors like employment, income and livelihoods 
(Hayashi, 2012; Oloruntoba et al., 2017). Conversely, the recovery process involves physical 
and intangible elements. The physical elements involve the natural and built environment while 
the intangible elements involve the social and economic environment (Jensen, 1998; 
Oloruntoba et al., 2017). Community participation is  increasingly seen as an element of the 
Disaster recovery framework
Post-disaster recovery  
Local level
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recovery process as community processes contribute to the economic and social resilience at a 
local level (Kwok et al., 2016). An effective recovery management process needs to be 
adaptable and be looked at on a long-term scale (Oloruntoba et al., 2017). Due to the complex 
nature of the recovery process, a central coordinating group such as the local, state or national 
government may be inaugurated to managing the decision making the process for the recovery 
process (Kwok et al., 2016; Oloruntoba et al., 2017). Thus, there is a growing need to achieve 
a coordinated and collaborative recovery process (Oloruntoba et al., 2017). 
 
The relationship between pre-disaster planning and post-disaster recovery  
 
Pre-disaster planning reduces the risks of natural disasters (Saunders et al., 2007; Strusińska-
Correia, 2017). It plays a crucial role in mitigating post-disaster effects and involves structural 
and non-structural measures including risks assessments, land-use management, asset 
management and other risk-reduction projects (Jensen, 1998; Godschalk et al., 1999; Saunder 
et al., 2007). Even though infrastructural measures are constructed with extreme events in 
mind, there are limitations to structural protection barriers (Koshimura et al., 2014). Many 
studies have shown that the sole reliance on structural protection against natural disasters is not 
recommended (Koshimura et al., 2014; Plümper et al., 2017), and this is exemplified by the 
case study below. Thus, the focus is shifting from infrastructural investments towards 
educational investments (Strusińska-Correia, 2017; Plümper et al., 2017). In other words, there 
is focus on mitigation measures in a longer term, shifting from reactive to proactive approaches 
for natural emergency management policy (Godschalk et al., 1999). 
 
 
Case Study: The Tōhoku Earthquake vs Protection Barriers (adopted from Plümper et al., 2017)  
 
Many Japanese towns have built tsunami walls to protect against tsunami disasters. The physical 
barriers gave the community a sense of safety, and as a consequence, people were tempted not to 
take individual precautionary measures. The Tōhoku Earthquake was larger than expected, and the 
protection barriers failed to protect the communities as a result.  
 
 
Many studies have shown that educational initiatives are practical approaches to the recovery 
process. The educational initiatives include measures at the local level (Roggema and Yan, 
 11 
2017) that consists of community engagement and involvement; as well as a shift in the 
decision-making process and can be reflected in the policy formation process  (Lun and Ohba, 
2012). However, development of policies, in turn, has complications within and the case study 
below illustrates the argument by Mochizuki and Komendantova (2017). The ideas introduced 
by Mochizuki and Komendantova (2017) are reinforced by the research conducted by Goto et 
al., (2012) and Stimpson (2011), where geomorphic features could inform disaster frequency 
and occurrence. In conclusion, pre-disaster planning has significant impacts on the post-
disaster recovery process, and as mentioned, it involves both physical and intangible elements 
(Kwok et al., 2016). The following section provides an overview of what post-disaster recovery 
is and explores the main themes that emerged from the literature research. 
 
Case study: Proposed changes to policy making following the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake (adopted 
from Mochizuki and Komendantova (2017)  
 
A sound emergency management is reflected in the underlying policy in place. Many scholars have 
emphasised on the importance of planning policies when it comes to emergency management, but 
Mochizuki and Komendantova (2017) argues otherwise. They claim that the current method of policy 
drafting has an overreliance on documented hazard risks. Mochizuki and Komendantova suggest 
that policies should be based upon scientific facts. There seem to be limited interactions between 
decision and policymakers and the scientific community, and the authors argue that it is part of the 
reason why the government failed to anticipate the catastrophic event in Tōhoku. In order to 
incorporate lessons learned from the event, they proposed revisions on earthquake and tsunami risks 
that includes ancient historical texts, tsunami deposits, and other scientific records.      
 
 
Post-disaster recovery framework 
 
A framework that coordinates internal and external collaboration is warranted to implement 
post-disaster recovery efforts (Roggema and Yan, 2017).  It is essential that the framework 
promotes cross-sectoral integration and partnerships and captures all segments of communities 
(Kwok et al., 2016). This is because the effectiveness of a framework is tightly intertwined to 
the economic and social resilience, which itself, is synonymous to the ideas of sustainable 
management, economic growth and social development (Kwok et al., 2016). In other words, 
stakeholder collaborations and community involvement are crucial in shaping the 
reconstruction framework in the economic, environmental, cultural and social environments of 
 12 
a region (Saunders and Becker, 2015; Mochizuki and Komendantova, 2017; Strusińska-
Correia, 2017). 
 
Local contexts also come into play for the post-disaster recovery framework. This includes 
geographical features and social elements, namely hazards vulnerability, population rate and 
economic productivity (Strunsińska-Correia, 2017). Besides, the transportation network can 
also influence decisions on emergency management regarding evacuation routes and 
infrastructural capacity (Tomsen et al., 2014). Moreover, this presents an opportunity for the 
framework to utilise the local knowledge and pre-existing social relationships, and thus, 
strengthening the resilience at a local level and contributing to a more effective recovery 
framework (Becken and Hughney, 2013; Kwok et al., 2016). However, multiple studies have 
shown that there is a lack of community focus when it comes to recovery efforts. This is due 
to poor leadership and minimal collaborations at different levels (Kawata et al., 2018). This 
has significant implications on the local economy and social capital, and thus, diminishing the 
resilience factors of a region (Kwok et al., 2016; Kawata et al., 2018). The following sub-
section pertain to the importance of post-disaster recovery at a local level. 
 
Local level post-disaster recovery  
 
Strong community networks and involvement, combined with an enforcing policy framework 
that is adaptable and open to reviews and adjustments are key to building resilient communities 
(Shimizu, 2013; Roggema and Yan, 2017). The policy environment influences the recovery 
process, and it is of concern that few policy documents focus on the concept of resilience 
(Shimizu, 2013). Resilience is an idea that has been mentioned by multiple scholars. It is 
defined as the capacity of a system to adapt to disturbance while maintaining its status quo 
(Chowdhury et al., 2018). Apart from the natural environment, other factors that relate to 
resilience include the economic environment and the social capital of a community, which is a 
critical factor in disaster recovery (Jensen, 1998; Kwok et al., 2016). In short, the social capital 
is closely related to the economic and natural environments and a resilient community is built 
through a collaborative and inclusive decision-making process (Kwok et al., 2016; Becken and 
Hughney, 2013). The social environment can be difficult to quantify, but it is important as it 
highly impacts the quality and speed of the recovery process (Alipour et al., 2015). As 
mentioned by Kawata et al. (2016), there is an unequal focus between physical reconstruction 
efforts and social restoration in a post-disaster recovery environment. Therefore, in order to 
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minimise post-disaster community disruption, there is an emphasis on developing social 
resilience in communities (Hatton et al., 2017). In addition, it promotes community 
responsibility and self-reliance and thus, improving resilience towards potential disasters 
(Jensen, 1998). Based on these findings, it became apparent that a top-down approach is neither 
sustainable, nor it is effective. Thus, it emphasises on the importance of community 
engagement and establishing functioning community spaces (Kwok et al., 2016). 
 
Community participation is the driving force for the post-disaster recovery process (Chang et 
al., 2011). However, there is a lack of community engagement and involvement when it comes 
to post-disaster management (Kawata et al., 2018). This leads to the importance of 
communication as it plays a key role in influencing community response for the post-disaster 
recovery process. It is the role of the authorities in charge to distribute relevant and timely 
information (Jensen, 1998). These include aspects of community recovery, such as resource 
lists, public information, and rebuild updates (Jensen, 1998; Anikeeva et al., 2014). 
Community spaces act as a place for post-disaster information distribution and promote health 
and well-being during the recovery phase (Kwok et al., 2016). Moreover, the social media 
platform is a powerful form of communication as it provides up-to-date information and 
reaches a wide scope of demographic. It also acts as a platform for communities to voice their 
concerns and experiences of the disaster (Anikeeva et al., 2014). In other words, 
communication goes both ways, and this is crucial when it comes to the post-disaster recovery 
process. This local-level information exchange between stakeholders and community provides 
a platform to incorporate the community values in the reconstruction process and utilise local-
level knowledge (Becken and Hughney, 2013; Roggema and Yan, 2017). Additionally, it 
strengthens the community bonds and reinforces the trust between decision-makers and the 
local community, thus, increasing social resilience (Kwok et al., 2016; Roggema and Yan, 
2017). Although participative processes create a platform for community education and 
strengthens resilience level both on spatial and temporal scales, it can be complex and time-
consuming (Roggema and Yan, 2017) The diverse range of stakeholders also means a diverse 
range of views and priorities, which poses as another challenge in practice. Conversely, the 
portrayal of negative media would influence the recovery process (Becken and Hughney, 
2013).  
 
Collaboration is also a key concept discussed by multiple scholars. There are strong arguments 
that collaboration provides a platform for data collection and exchange (Hatton et al., 2017) 
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and strengthens the relationships amongst the stakeholders involved in the recovery process 
(Karunasean and Amaratunga, 2016). Intergovernmental collaboration is essential when it 
comes to emergency management in terms of development of policies (Godschalk et al., 1999). 
However, local level involvement is equally important and this is also one of the major gaps 
identified in the literature. There is a lack of collaboration at the local level (Kawata et al., 
2018) and decisions are made at a high level that are often not inclusive of the vulnerable 
sectors (Becken and Hughney, 2013). Local level mitigation measures are important and this 
needs to be addressed as collaboration creates a dialogue between people (Godschalk et al., 
1999; Nguyen et al., 2017) and it plays an important role when it comes to resourcing for post-
disaster recovery efforts (Chang et al., 2011).  
 
Resource availability is a key theme discussed by multiple authors. This is because the 
availability of resources is regarded as the driving force for the success of a recovery process 
(Singh and Wilkinson, 2008; Chang et al., 2011). There is a variety of resources needed after 
a disaster. This includes human, financial, logistical and administrative support (Shimizu, 
2013). The commitment of resources for post-disaster management needs to be put in place in 
policies and strategies to ensure effective and efficient management in an emergency 
environment  (Jensen, 1998). Coordination of the resources from the different stakeholders is 
also vital in a post-disaster recovery environment (Chang et al., 2011). Additionally, there is 
an emphasis on integrating local resources into post-disaster recovery efforts because it 
improves resilience in the community (Roggema and Yan, 2017). However, resources are often 
limited, and it can be difficult for post-disaster management, especially when the complex and 
uncertain nature of disasters is added into the equation (Shimizu, 2013). Besides, the lack of 
resources has an impact on pre-disaster reduction initiatives (Becken and Hughney, 2013), and 
thus, affecting the quality of the recovery process (Kwok et al., 2016). 
 
Awareness is another crucial factor in the post-disaster recovery process. It is of utmost 
importance because raising awareness promotes a higher level of preparedness, which, as 
mentioned, is vital for post-disaster recovery (Jensen, 1998). Moreover, lessons learned from 
previous events could be incorporated into emergency policies to better manage future disasters 
(Lawson et al., 2018). Thus, there is a need for flexible and adaptable policies that integrate 
and coordinate the knowledge and process in a post-disaster recovery environment (Shimizu, 
2013). This addresses the uncertainty and complexity of future events and thereby, increases 
the resilience of a community (Shimizu, 2013). The media also plays a role when it comes to 
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raising awareness of the community (Kawata et al., 2018). The local authority is also playing 
a vital role in promoting public awareness through risk-reduction activities at a local level 
(Jensen, 1998; Roggema and Yan, 2017). The communication at the local level allows for 
better coordination of emergency management (Lawson et al., 2018). Thus, leadership plays a 
vital role when it comes to connecting community networks and prioritising recovery activities 
that contributes to medium and long-term recovery (Becken and Hughney, 2013; Kwok et al., 
2016).  
 
Disaster waste is also increasingly seen as an important field of research for post-disaster 
recovery. Roggema and Yan (2017) discussed the complexity of disaster wastes and how that 
affected the recovery process. Hayashi (2012) conducted similar research on disaster wastes 
and its implication on the local industries. One of the key themes discussed by the scholars is 
the economic damage from disaster wastes. Even though there is an economic boost during the 
reconstruction phase, there are long term economic and psychological impacts that persists 
long after a disastrous event (Hayashi, 2012). The case study below illustrates the nuclear 
disaster in the Tōhoku region.  
 
Case study: Implications of disaster wastes in the Tōhoku region, Japan [adopted from McCurry, 
2011 and Hayashi, 2012] 
 
In 2011, the Tōhoku region in Japan was severely impacted by a threefold  disaster event consisting 
of an earthquake, tsunami and a nuclear power plant accident. The meltdown of the nuclear power 
plant in Fukushima lead to contaminations of radioactive materials in the surrounding areas. Apart 
from the psycho-social impacts, this has significant effect on the local industries (agriculture and 
fishery) as communities were evacuated from the affected regions. The effects were evident when 
consumers were hesitant purchasing food and products produced in the in the Fukushima area, even 





Chapter Summary  
 
This analysis of the academic literature has presented the key concepts and debates around 
post-disaster recovery. As discussed, pre-disaster management highly impacts post-disaster 
recovery process in the social and economic environments. A bottom-up recovery process is 
vital to improving the resilience of the communities. The main points discussed in this chapter 
are intertwined and include community engagement and involvement and how that comes into 
play with awareness and resource availability (Figure 2-2). There are several case studies 
included to illustrate some of the concepts introduced in the literature. 
 
 













Chapter 3: Assessment of Policy and Planning Documents  
 
This chapter presents the policy and planning context in place for post-disaster recovery 
management in New Zealand and Japan. The first section consists of a content review of the 
policies and planning documents in order to evaluate the post-disaster recovery environments 
in the Tōhoku and Kaikōura regions. The results of the content analysis are discussed at the 
end of the section. The documents were selected on the basis on their influence and application 
in the recovery process in the respective regions (Table 3-1). This is to assess the effectiveness 
of the plans and policies in place and to corroborate with the findings from the key informant 
interviews.  
 
Table 3-1 The table below lists the policies and planning documents reviewed. 
Japan New Zealand 
• Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake (2012) 
• Act on Special Measures for the 
Reconstruction and Revitalisation of 
Fukushima (2012) 
• Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in 
Response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in the “Reconstruction and 
Revitalisation Period (2016)  
• Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in 
response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (2011) 
• Outline of the System of Special Zone for 
Reconstruction (2011) 
• Towards Reconstruction “Hope beyond 
the Disaster” (2011)  
• Resource Management Act (1991) 
• National Coastal Policy Statement (2010) 
• Recovery Management- Director’s 
Guidelines for CDEM Groups (2005) 
• National Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Plan Order (2015)  
• Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery 
Act (2016) 









The Japanese government consists of a three-tiered administration: the national government, 
prefectures and municipalities (Ogata, 2016). The Minister of State for Disaster Management 
is appointed to the Cabinet. The Disaster Management Bureau is involved in the development 
of disaster management plans and overall coordination on the response to disasters (Ogata, 
2016). The Reconstruction Agency was established to implement government policies and to 
manage reconstruction strategy and initiatives following the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake. This 
involves allocating financial assistance and implementing guidelines and plans by the 
Government for the recovery process in the Tōhoku region (Reconstruction Agency, 2019). 
The Agency is temporarily established within the Cabinet and headed by a Minister to 
administer reconstruction efforts for a period of ten years (Figure 3-1).  
 
 
Figure 3-1 The structure for the recovery process in Tōhoku, Japan. The Agency was set up to 
accelerate structural reconstruction and revitalisation of the affected regions in Tōhoku.[sourced from 
Reconstruction Agency, 2019] 
 
Similarly, the governance structure in New Zealand consists of the national, regional and local 
government. In the Kaikōura context, a national recovery management structure was placed 
upon the Kaikōura District Council. This is because the Kaikōura District Council declared the 
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event as a national emergency (Woods et al., 2017). The national agencies coordinate the 
efforts working with the CDEM groups and the task groups/ subtask groups to promote parallel 
arrangements between the local, regional and national levels (Figure 3-2). The ministers may 
meet as the Domestic and External Security Coordination (DESC) Committee to monitor the 
responses and provide strategic level oversight. ODSC supports ministers in developing high-
level strategic direction, policy and priorities and in authorising additional resources to deal 
with the disaster. This is to achieve timely, effective, whole-of-government responses with 
minimal interference to the statutory powers and responsibilities of ministers and departments. 
The recovery coordinators are appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of MCDEM’s 
director, who are involved with the local-level management. 
 
 
Figure 3-2 The diagram shows the recovery structure following the Kaikōura Earthquake in 2011. 
[sourced from Recovery Management- Director’s Guidelines for CDEM Groups, 2005] 
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Policy and Planning Documents in Japan  
 
There is a number of planning documents and policies pertaining to post-disaster recovery in 
Japan. These documents were selected for their influence on the reconstruction process in the 
Tōhoku region. It is important to note that the documents are discussed in the order of higher-
ranking policies to lowest ranking to illustrate the provisions of the statues. The documents 
were translated by from the Reconstruction Agency, thus, providing more ground and 
credibility.  
 
Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (2012)  
 
The Act describes the reconstruction process following the 2011 Tōhoku Disaster. The purpose 
of the Act is to provide smooth and prompt reconstruction from the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and revitalising the image of a vibrant Japan. The document presents the basic 
philosophy to achieve an effective reconstruction process. It also provides provisions on 
financial resources for reconstruction. Additionally, the Act creates the system of Special Zone 
for Reconstruction, by which the details will be outlined in later sub-sections.  
 
Article 2 presents the Basic Philosophy of which the reconstruction process will be based upon. 
This includes economic and social recovery; promoting collaboration; community 
participation; innovative reconstruction; economic opportunities; cultural and social 
restoration and management of nuclear accident. Overall, the article sets out the aims to 
revitalise the economy, promotes collaboration between central and local government, 
emphasises community involvement and encourages innovative measures that address 
demographic changes and shifts in the socio-economic climate.  
 
The Act also sets out the responsibilities of the government, local government and the 
importance of community participation. As mentioned, the Act also creates a System of Special 
Zone for Reconstruction. The document outlines that the Reconstruction Headquarters will 
manage the reconstruction process in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake. The 
Headquarters old the jurisdiction for planning, drafting and the overall coordination of the 
Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction. The Act also provides provisions on the establishment of 
the Reconstruction Agency and Reconstruction Design Council.   
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Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and Revitalisation of Fukushima (2012)  
 
This Act is established to facilitate the reconstruction and revitalisation of Fukushima 
following the nuclear disaster. This consists of guidelines and special measures for the 
reconstruction. It also includes measures for revitalising regions where evacuation orders have 
been or are to be lifted. The Act incorporates aspects from public health, economy and social 
inclusion to assist independence and autonomy of local governments in Fukushima. It also lays 
out the roles and responsibilities (delegated authority) of the Prime Minister, Governor of 
Fukushima Prefecture, Cabinet and other governmental bodies. It also includes provisions for 
agricultural activities and the Port and Harbour Facilities, Road Act, Coast Act. This also 
includes living environment improvement projects, special housing, financial support and 
Council Stabilisation of Housing to assist evacuees due to the effects of the Nuclear Disaster. 
The document also outlines research and development concerning the effects of radiation on 
human bodies, contamination surveys, public health and initiatives contributing to the creation 
of new industries. The Act also provides details on strengthening international competitiveness 
in the industry through the use of renewable energy sources. 
 
Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake in the 
“Reconstruction and Revitalisation Period” (2016)  
 
This guideline was enacted in response to the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake. The guideline provides 
details of the role of the Japanese Government regarding post-disaster recovery efforts. The 
first section of the guideline outlines the current state of the reconstruction as of 2016. To 
quickly summarise, there is a 10-year reconstruction plan and the first five years leading up to 
2015 was categorised as the “intensive reconstruction period”. There was a heavy focus on the 
structural restoration around the affected regions. It includes constructing permanent housing 
complexes and decontamination from the nuclear plant disaster around Fukushima. 
Furthermore, the guideline focusses on the restoration of the local industries and livelihoods of 
the affected communities. The scale of the damage of the affected areas parallels with the 
progress of the reconstruction efforts. In other words, the bigger the damage, the longer it takes 
for restoration efforts. As the reconstruction advances, more support is needed for the local 
communities and individuals affected by the disaster. Thus, the latter five-year of the 
reconstruction phase is allocated as the “reconstruction and revitalisation period”. This 
recovery phase emphasises the social aspects of the recovery process. This phase of recovery 
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focuses on responding to the challenges and needs drawn from the experiences and lessons 
learned as the reconstruction progresses. This is achieved by creating a local revitalisation 
model that emphasises on self-reliance and forming community networks in disaster-affected 
areas.  
 
In terms of financial support, the government have allocated 32 trillion yen over the ten-year 
reconstruction period for the recovery and reconstruction projects around the Tōhoku region. 
These funds are intended to support reconstruction activities and promote the rebuilding of 
cities and towns that are more resilient to future disasters. The government addresses mid- to 
long-term issues such as population and economic decline in the affected areas. There is also 
an aim to promote the affected areas as destinations for both tourists and residents, creating the 
image of a “New Tōhoku”. The document also outlines specific initiatives in each sector, 
namely, psycho-social recovery, structural restoration, revitalisation of industry and 
livelihoods, management of the nuclear plant, and creation of “New Tōhoku”. This consists of 
a range of public-private partnerships and involves a variety of stakeholders, including non-
profit organisations. The document also describes the development of a national model when 
it comes to post-disaster management. The national model involves utilising human resources 
of both national and local governments, as well as human resources from private sectors like 
non-profit organisations and universities. An example of a specific initiative is leveraging from 
events like the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and the 2019 Rugby World Cup to help revitalise the 
image of the Tōhoku region.  
 
As mentioned, psycho-social recovery is one of the critical foci outlined in this document. This 
includes all demographics and involves physical restoration measures such as relocation from 
temporary to permanent housing located upland to minimise effects from future disasters. 
Assistance is also provided to affected individuals to form community bonds and integrating 
with the existing communities. Reconstruction efforts also include revitalisation of towns, 
restoring transportation networks, developing and rebuilding medical and educational 
facilities. It is important to note that the restoration of critical infrastructure services like roads, 
water and sewerage services have been prioritised in the “intensive reconstruction period” 
following the 2011 disaster. The recovery and reconstruction work outlined in this document 
focusses on finalising the transportation and logistical networks.  
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Besides, the document details the restoration of agricultural activities along with the move 
towards a more disaster-resilient economy and community. As outlined in the guideline, this 
is supported by the Reconstruction agency of the municipalities through human and financial 
resources. As mentioned, self-rebuilding of residential properties is promoted and financial 
support is outlined in the Schedule for Housing Reconstruction. About the reconstruction of 
local industries, there is a focus on creative reconstruction. This focusses on tourism and 
restoring fishery processing facilities. There is also a push for self-reliant, sustainable, dynamic 
and productive local industries, which is outlined in the Strategy for Creation of Industrial 
Reconstruction. The guideline also mentions the Special Zone for Reconstruction. These are 
areas with specific regulations and support measures to revitalise affected industries and 
residents’ livelihoods. Furthermore, the document summaries different forms of financial 
supports and includes provisions on grants allocation to struggling local authorities.  
 
The guideline also provides details on international and local support for the nuclear plant 
disaster. These include evacuation orders, reconstructing and revitalising the Fukushima 
Prefecture, promoting cooperation between prefectures and decontamination of the nuclear 
wastes. In terms of the management of nuclear wastes, this is achieved by research, safe 
handling of contaminated materials, and management of disposal sites. The document also 
proposes establishing hubs for international and industrial and academic collaboration to 
investigate avenues of renewable energies, agricultural, forestry and the fishery sectors. 
Assistance is also provided to the evacuees to promote a stable living environment. The 
document concludes by stating that there will be archiving of data to make sure the lessons 
learned are passed down and help develop a more proactive attitude towards disaster 
management. 
 
Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (2011) 
 
This Guideline outlines the measures for recovery and reconstruction over ten years following 
the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake, in terms of economic and disaster prevention and reduction 
measures. The support for reconstruction is listed and includes the incorporation of local-level 
resources. This input of resources would be from the local governments and private sectors 
unaffected by the disaster. The document also discusses the revision of the administrative 
systems. This consists of amendments to procedural measures and offering financial support 
and human resources. The Guideline also introduced the System of Special Zone for 
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Reconstruction, which is established to assist affected communities concerning regulations and 
administrative procedures; economic aid packages; and streamlining multiple authorisation 
processes to accelerate reconstruction efforts. The document also details the flexibility in 
government grants for the local governments. This is related to subsidiary projects like road 
and school construction. It also includes provisions on regional government securing funding 
by selling state-owned properties; reducing governmental expenditures; and temporary 
taxation measures.  
 
The document also provides details on reconstruction efforts through private sectors. There 
would be the utilisation of private sector funding and knowledge for the reconstruction process. 
It also focusses on building disaster-resistant and resilient regions that would respond to the 
challenges of aging communities. To summarise, this includes prioritising infrastructures based 
on selection and population concentration, community safety, promoting renewable energy and 
environment, utilising local resources and disaster reduction measures with a combination of 
soft and hard measures. The regional conditions like geography and topography will also be 
taken into account.  Furthermore, the document encapsulates local level measures which 
include providing secure and stable residence for affected communities; offering human 
resources assistance to support for the planning of municipalities; and aiding reconstruction 
projects.  
The document also introduces an employment measure called “Japan as One”. This assists 
employment issues and opportunities and lifestyle stability of the affected communities. In 
addition, the Guideline also promotes education by rebuilding schools. To address the issues, 
the government also provides financial assistance and offers to counsel to children affected by 
the disaster. In terms of economic activities, the document gives priority to early recovery 
logistic infrastructure. This includes roads, ports, harbours and seaside railways. As mentioned, 
the document promotes renewable energy sectors and social inclusion and introduces the idea 
of “Cool Japan Initiatives”. This provides a platform for the promotion of a positive image for 
the Tōhoku region. International examples are also drawn to assist in the recovery process. To 
better prepare for future disasters, the Guideline suggests establishing a standard system which 
can be utilised nation-wide. This would include improvement on disaster observation, 
monitoring and forecasting. The document also stresses on a review of the emergency policy 
to improve the response capacity of the fire department, police and coast guards and promotes 
the concept of tsunami resilient community-building. The Guideline creates a framework for 
disaster-prevention education, incorporating the idea of escape measures and developing the 
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capacity of security forces. In addition to the structure of government for reconstruction and 
the follow-up mechanisms, the Guideline also presents provisions for research and record on 
nuclear management. 
 
Outline of the System of Special Zone for Reconstruction (2011)  
 
This document presents the process of a Special Zone for Reconstruction following the 2011 
Tōhoku disaster. This includes a variety of incentives like tax breaks, funding, and deregulation 
and simplified procedure in areas identified as Special Zone for Reconstruction (Figure 3-3). 
This document outlines the mechanisms to support reconstruction efforts by local governments. 
In terms of regulations and procedures, there are reduced requirements for residential 
properties and industry development. For example, special permits would be issued for 
developing in exclusive zones; and there would be minimal procedures required for facilities 
related to food, forestry, biomass energy. This is to facilitate businesses for manufacturing and 
retail in the affected regions (Figure 3-4). Furthermore, the planning document details the 
restructuring of land use; along with tax breaks and grants to promote investments and 
employment opportunities through reconstruction projects. Figure 3-5 summarises the 





Figure 3-3 The diagram shows the Framework of the System of Special Zone for Reconstruction in the 
Tōhoku region in response to the 2011 disaster. It shows the process of assigning affected areas into 




Figure 3-4 The diagram above illustrates three examples of the reconstruction plan and projects for 
areas allocated as Special Zone for Reconstruction. [Sourced from Outline of the System of Special 
Zone for Reconstruction, 2011 
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Figure 3-5 The diagram shows the framework of the Law for Special Zone for Reconstruction in the 
Tōhoku region. It outlines the key process within the framework for areas assigned as Special Zone for 




Towards Reconstruction “Hope beyond the Disaster” (2011)  
 
This document outlines the “Seven Principles for the Reconstruction Framework” for the 
Tōhoku region following the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake. The following table outlines the 
principles and is sourced from the document. These principles were formulated by the 
Reconstruction Design Council to act as the guiding philosophy for the report.  
 
Table 3-2 The table below outlines the Seven Principles for the Reconstruction Framework sourced 
from Towards Reconstruction “Hope beyond the Disaster” (2011).  
Seven Principles for the Reconstruction Framework 
Principle One  For us, the surviving, there is no other starting point for the path to recovery than to 
remember and honor the many lives that have been lost. Accordingly, we shall 
record the disaster for eternity, including through the creation of memorial forests 
and monuments, and we shall have the disaster scientifically analyzed by a broad 
range of scholars to draw lessons that will be shared with the world and passed 
down to posterity.  
Principle Two Given the vastness and diversity of the disaster region, we shall make community-
focussed reconstruction the foundation of efforts towards recovery. The national 
government shall support that reconstruction through general guidelines and 
institutional design.  
Principle Three In order to revive disaster-afflicted Tohoku, we shall pursue forms of recovery and 
reconstruction that tap into the region’s latent strengths and lead to technological 
innovation. We shall strive to develop this region’s socioeconomic potential to lead 
Japan in the future.  
Principle Four  While preserving the strong bonds of local residents, we shall construct disaster 
resilient safe and secure communities and natural energy-powered region.  
Principle Five  Japan’s economy cannot be restored unless the disaster areas are rebuilt. The 
disaster areas cannot be truly rebuilt unless Japan’s economy is restored. 
Recognizing these facts, we shall simultaneously pursue reconstruction of the 
afflicted areas and revitalization of the nation.  
Principle Six We shall seek an early resolution of the nuclear accidents, and shall devote closer 
attention to support and recovery efforts for the areas affected by the accidents.  
Principle Seven  All of us living now shall view the disaster as affecting our own lives, and shall 
pursue reconstruction with a spirit of solidarity and mutual understanding that 
permeates the entire nation.  
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The document outlines a list of recommendations that involves drawing lessons and 
commemorating the disaster; community focussed reconstruction; tapping into local strengths 
to promote technological innovation; preserving strong community bonds; restoring the 
economy, and resolution for nuclear accidents. The document presents a comparison amongst 
the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Great Kanto Earthquake and the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake. The challenges compounded by the nuclear accident was also detailed in the 
document. The plan introduced a new concept for rebuilding and reconstruction. This focuses 
on the local communities and emphasises on the concept of disaster reduction. This also 
includes building communication networks and revitalising the local community. Additionally, 
the document discusses a long-term outlook regarding population changes, landscapes, public 
transportation and energy conservation.  
 
There are targeted recommendations specific to the regions. The extent of damage of each 
region was assessed and categorised into different scales, from low lying areas to inland areas 
damaged by liquefaction. This document also integrates existing land-use planning procedures 
and coordinates reconstruction with existing land-use planning systems. There are also 
adjustments proposed for land usage through planning projects and land improvement projects. 
The roles of the national, municipal and prefectural governments were laid out in the document. 
The national government is responsible for setting the overall policy for the reconstruction 
efforts but focussing on municipality-led reconstruction. This local-level reconstruction 
process incorporates local resources and knowledge, whereby support is provided for 
struggling municipalities by the national government.  
 
The document also outlines efforts on restoring life and livelihoods of the affected 
communities. This is discussed with regard to culture, health, the revival of local economic 
activities, connecting infrastructure to the local economy (e.g. renewable energy) and 
allocating special zones for reconstruction. Moreover, the document presents recommendations 
for the management of the nuclear accident in 2011. These include reconstruction efforts in 
terms of responding to future disasters and managing the health of the communities. There is 
also an emphasis on open reconstruction where it consists of the participation of the local 
communities, drawing lessons from international communities and information sharing and 
research on post-disaster recovery. The document also noted that the legislation had been 
formulated in response to the disasters, and there is currently no general system or structure 
created to respond to future tsunami disasters. 
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Policy and Planning Documents New Zealand 
  
Apart from the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act (2016), the other documents 
assessed in this chapter are non-specific to the Kaikōura recovery efforts. However, these 
documents were selected on the basis of their influence on the recovery process in the region. 
These documents are related to the legislative framework and recovery guidelines that 
informed the recovery process in Kaikōura. The documents will be discussed in 
chronological order of the oldest to latest.  
 
Resource Management Act 1991  
 
The Resource Management Act is the primary environmental statue in New Zealand. The 
purpose of the Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical resources 
in New Zealand. This includes managing the use, development and protection of natural and 
physical resources which allows people and communities to provide for their social, economic, 
and cultural wellbeing. The Act defines the jurisdiction over decision-making. It does not 
specifically address the issues of the post-disaster recovery process, but it defines the 
“management of significant risks from natural hazards” as one of the “matters of national 
importance” under part 2. It states the roles and functions of the territorial authorities in 
“avoiding or mitigating” the effects from natural hazards. In addition, it creates a framework 
for policy statements and planning documents, taking into account the social, cultural, built 
and natural environments.  
 
Recovery Management- Director’s Guidelines for CDEM Groups (2005)  
 
This Guideline provides a coordinated framework for recovery planning and management in 
New Zealand. It is designed to help CDEM Groups with the recovery process and development 
of recovery plans. The document states that a management framework that incorporates 
management of national, regional and local level is required. It emphasises the importance of 
recovery activities and describes that recovery activities begin while the response activities are 
still in progress. This is because the decisions made during the response phase will have an 
influence on the recovery action plan. It also notes that community involvement and 
communication are two important factors of the recovery process. Additionally, it stresses on 
the importance of having an exit strategy (i.e. marking an end to the support during the recovery 
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period) in place, allowing a smooth transition from formal recovery assistance to business-as-
usual.  
 
The document provides a comprehensive guideline for the development of CDEM Group Plans 
in relation to coordination of resources, community rehabilitation, reduction measures, 
economic revitalisation, environmental restoration and social recovery. This includes a range 
of measures, from land-use planning to public education. The Guideline also provides details 
on the governance structure in a recovery environment. It consists of the roles and 
responsibilities at the national, regional and local level. Within the governance structure, task 
groups may be set up, and within the task groups there may be subtask groups depending on 
the scale of the emergency. There is the recovery management group, which reports to the 
CDEM Group; the social environment task group; economic environment task group; built 
environment task group, and the natural environment task group.  
 
New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010  
 
The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (NZCPS) is a national policy statement under the 
Resource Management Act 1991. The purpose of the Act is to state policies in relation to the 
coastal environment of New Zealand. One of the key fields the Act focusses on is promoting 
sustainable management in “activities in the coastal environment that are susceptible to the 
effects of natural hazards such as coastal erosion and tsunami, and those associated with 
climate change”.  
 
Objective 5 of the NZCPS states that coastal hazard risk, taking account of climate change are 
managed by land-use planning measures; risk-reduction measures; and protecting or restoring 
natural defences to coastal hazards. The NZCPS also notes the need for integrated management 
of natural and physical resources in the coastal environment. This also include identifying areas 
that are potentially affected by coastal hazards, and in those areas, development would be 
limited and managed to minimise the adverse effects from coastal hazards.   
 
National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order (2015)  
 
The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order became operative on 1st 
December 2015. The purpose of the plan is to define the guiding principles and states the roles 
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and responsibilities for Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) across the reduction, 
readiness, response and recovery phases (4 Rs) at the national level. This is so all agencies and 
CDEM Groups could:  
 
• Understand the hazards and risks; and  
• Work to reduce those hazards; and  
• Build resilience in respect of those hazards; and  
• Build capability and capacity to provide co-ordinated, integrated, and effective response 
to, and recovery from, emergencies.  
Sourced from Part 2 of National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015  
 
As stated in the plan, the audience for this plan is for agencies and CDEM Groups during a 
state of national emergency, a national transition period, or an emergency requiring co-
ordination and support at the national level. This plan creates a framework to managing hazards 
and risk at a national level. The list of hazards (either singular or in combination) includes 
earthquake, volcanic hazards, tsunamis, wildfires and urban fires, animal pests and diseases 
and infrastructure failures. This plan can be used to address the consequence of an emergency 
arising from any hazards. Possible consequences include displacement, isolation, loss of 
lifeline utility services, structural damage, economic losses, environmental and cultural 
degradation. The Plan also provides recommendations for risk management standard and 
coordinates resources needed for the local management of emergency. The role of each agency 
and CDEM Group is stated and include monitoring development and evolving trends in 
hazards. It also consists of assessing risks and communities’ vulnerability and implementing 
measures across the 4 Rs.  
 
The Plan sets out the structure of emergency management under the Act. It allows the 
declaration of a state of national emergency, which gives power to the National Controller with 
a delegation under section 10 of the Act. The National Controller will co-ordinate, direct and 
control the resources during the transition period. In addition, the Act creates an Officials 
Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) system, which 
provides policy oversight and governance of national security issues. It operates at the National 
Security Committee of Cabinet level, which is the main decision-making body of executive 
government for coordinating and directing national responses in case of a national emergency. 
Furthermore, part 5 of the Act states the roles and responsibilities of government agencies at 
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the national, regional and local level. The agencies include Ministry of Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management, CDEM Groups and Clusters (e.g. telecommunication provides, 
welfare services, science and research providers, international assistance providers).  
 
The Plan is prescriptive and defines the objectives and principles across the 4 Rs. For the 
purpose of this research, details regarding the recovery phase is provided. As defined in part 9 
of the Act, recovery involves “the co-ordinated efforts and processes used to bring about the 
immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a 
community following an emergency”. The objectives of the recovery phases include 
minimising the consequences of emergency; restoring the social, psychological, economic, 
cultural, built, and natural environments; introducing opportunities to adapt to future needs of 
the community and reducing effects of future events. The principles of recovery involve the 
four environments, namely, social, economic, natural and built. The Act states that recovery 
processes should be adaptable and flexible. The recovery measures should also be implemented 
“as soon as practicable” to enable “individuals to continue functioning as part of the wider 
community”.  
 
Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act 2016  
 
The purpose of this Act is to assist in response and recovery processes for the councils and 
communities affected by the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquake in 2016. The assistance provided 
will be in relation to the following.  
1. Provide for economic recovery; 
2. Provide for the planning, rebuilding, and recovery of affected communities and persons, 
including-  
a. The repair and rebuilding of land, infrastructure the repair and rebuilding of land, 
infrastructure, and other property of affected communities or of any affected persons; 
and 
b. safety enhancements to, and improvements to the resilience of, that land, 
infrastructure, or other property; and 
c. facilitating co-ordinated efforts and processes for short-term, medium-term, and long-
term recovery; and 
d. facilitating the restoration and improvement of the economic, social, and cultural 
well-being, and the resilience, of affected communities or of any affected persons; and 
e. facilitating the restoration of the environment. 
Sourced from part 1 of the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act 2016  
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Part 2 of the Act sets out the provisions for the Orders in Council. It is important to note that 
these have been repealed on 1st April 2018, which emphasises the short-term, event-specific 
nature of the legislation. To summarise, the Act describes the roles and functions of the 
Governor-General, relevant Minister and the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquake Recovery Review 
Panel. The  Minister must appoint Recovery Review Panel of up to 6 persons in relation to 
environmental protection; mātauranga Māori and tikanga Māori; law, public administration or 
local government; and the nature of the affected communities (e.g  rural or urban). It also 
outlines the related supporting documents, which includes the Building Act 2004; Conservation 
Act 1987; Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002; Local Government Act 1974; Land 
Transport Act 1998; and Social Security Act 1964. 
 
National Disaster Resilience Strategy (2019) 
 
The National Disaster Resilience Strategy defines the goals and objectives for Civil Defence 
Emergency Management. It aims to incorporate lessons learned from the 2011 Canterbury and 
2016 Kaikōura Earthquake, along with other events in New Zealand and overseas. This 
document sits alongside a range of supporting documents, including the National CDEM Plan 
and Guide, the National Security Handbook, CDEM Group Plans. There are three priorities 
set out for the Strategy and a list of key focus of each priority is provided (Table 3-3).  
 
The Strategy has a focus on wellbeing and resilience. It looks beyond quantifiable costs of 
damage and rebuild and addresses a web of social and economic disruption. This is important 
as it leads to a flow-on effects to businesses and employment, psychological trauma, 
dislocation of communities, creation and exacerbation of social issues, disruption to normal 
lives and livelihoods, and uncertainty in the future. The document defines resilience as the 
ability to anticipate and resist disruptive events. It is achieved by minimising adverse impacts 
and respond effectively to maintain or recover functionality while adapting in a way that allows 
for learning and thriving. It is crucial to develop tolerance to a wide range of disasters and have 
the ability to remain effective across a range of future conditions. As stated in the Strategy, 
resilience requires an inclusive approach and involves all tiers of government (central, regional 
and local), the relevant stakeholders and the wider public.  
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Table 3-3 The table shows the three priorities of the National Disaster Resilience Strategy. [Adapted from National Disaster Resilience 
Strategy 2019] 
The priorities for the National Disaster Resilience Strategy 
1 Managing risks: what we can do to minimise the 
risks we face and limit the impacts to be managed if 
hazards occur; 
• Understanding risk scenarios 
• Establish organisational structure 
• Raising awareness  
• Fill in gaps in risk reduction 
policies  
• Promote sound development and 
investment practices  
• Assess economic impact of disaster 
and disruption  
2 Effective response to and recovery from 
emergencies: building our capability and capacity to 
manage emergencies when they do happen; and  
• Provide for safety and wellbeing of 
communities  
• Building relationships with iwi  
• Improve national leadership  
• Clearer delegation roles and 
responsibilities  
• Develop capability and capacity of 
emergency management workforce  
• Encourages informed decisions 
3 Enabling, empowering, and supporting 
community resilience: building a culture of 
resilience in New Zealand so that everyone can 
participate in and contribute to communities’- and the 
nation’s- resilience.  
• Empowering individuals  
• Promotes social connectedness  
• Introduce resilience 
• Address capacity and adequacy of 
critical infrastructure  
• Recognises long-term priorities  
• Develop a culture to resilience  
 
Furthermore, the Strategy outlines a number of plans and policies relevant to disaster 
management, including the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015- 2030 and the 
CDEM Act 2002. In short, the CDEM Act 2002 promotes sustainable management of hazards 
and contributes to the safety and wellbeing of the communities. The Act encourages wide 
participation at all levels and provides for planning and preparation of emergency events. It 
requires local authorities to coordinate reduction, readiness, response and recovery activities 
through regional groups. Moreover, it provides a basis for the integration of national and local 
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planning through national strategies and plans. Overall, the National Disaster Resilience 
Strategy 2019 describes the importance of the resilience in communities and promotes a wide, 
whole-of-society, participatory and inclusive approach when it comes to disaster management.   
 
Analysis of the contents of policy and planning documents  
 
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 is a global agreement 
developed in relation to post-disaster management. The framework provides a list of ideas and 
priorities at the global, national and local levels. This include risk assessments; managing risks; 
and introducing the idea of inclusive approach. This is to improve disaster risk reduction 
measures and the Sendai Framework plays a crucial role in the development of the post-disaster 
management strategies of the participating countries.  
 
The planning documents and policies were selected to assess the post-disaster recovery process 
in the legislative environment in Tōhoku and Kaikōura. The following table lists the documents 
reviewed in this chapter (Table 3-1). The assessment criteria of the documents are derived from 
the key themes that emerged in the academic literature review and the Sendai Framework. This 
includes community participation, resilience level, raising awareness level, collaboration, and 
allocation of resources. An overall evaluation of the documents in place will be provided. This 
is done through a ranking system, which consists of a scale from 0 to 2. The documents will be 
assessed against the five criteria mentioned above. 
 
Table 3-1 The table below lists the policies and planning documents reviewed 
Japan New Zealand 
• Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake (2012) 
• Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction 
and Revitalisation of Fukushima (2012) 
• Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake in the 
“Reconstruction and Revitalisation Period (2016)  
• Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake (2011) 
• Outline of the System of Special Zone for 
Reconstruction (2011) 
• Towards Reconstruction “Hope beyond the 
Disaster” (2011)  
• Resource Management Act (1991) 
• National Coastal Policy Statement (2010) 
• Recovery Management- Director’s Guidelines for 
CDEM Groups (2005) 
• National Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Plan Order (2015)  
• Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act 
(2016) 
• National Disaster Resilience Strategy (2019)  
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The first component is community participation. It was chosen as it is a vital element in the 
post-disaster recovery process, as identified by the scholars in Chapter Two. As discussed in 
the sources, an effective post-disaster recovery framework transpires at a local level. 
Communities form the base of local-level planning, and the role they play has been recognised 
as the main factor in post-disaster recovery. While it has been stated that there is currently a 
lack of community participation in the current recovery climate, it is crucial to consider the 
ramifications of community participation in post-disaster recovery within each plan. As 
mentioned, a scoring system will be introduced to assess the components raised in the academic 
literature review. In short, a score of 2 will be given if a plan gives effect to community 
participation when it comes to post-disaster management. If a plan takes community 
participation into account, a score of 1 will be given. Alternatively, a plan will be given a score 
of 0 if there is no mention of community-level consideration in a post-disaster recovery 
environment. Table 3-4 below illustrates the scoring key for community participation within 
each plan. 
 
Table 1-4 The table shows the scoring system for Component 1: community participation in a post-disaster environment. 
1  Community participation  
 2 Explicit consideration to community participation for post-disaster recovery      
 1 General recognition to community participation  
 0 Not identified   
 
The second component relates to the idea of resilience. This includes economic, social and 
structural resilience. As identified by the sources, resilience is a recent but crucial topic 
introduced to developing disaster management policies. Since resilience determines the quality 
and speed of recovery, it is vital to consider the amount of recognition within each plan. A 
scoring system of 0 to 2 is given to assess the weight given to the idea of resilience within each 
plan. If a plan stresses the importance of resilience in all environments, a score of 2 is given. 
A score of 1 is given if a plan mentions the idea of resilience, but only in a particular sector. A 
plan will be given a score of 0 if the idea of resilience is not introduced in the document. Table 
3-5 below summarises the key for the scoring system for Component 2.  
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Table 3-5 The table below identifies the key for Component 2: Resilience 
2  Introducing the idea of resilience in a post-disaster recovery environment     
 2 Explicit recognition to resilience in a post-disaster recovery framework     
 1 General recognition to the resilience in any environments  
 0 Not identified   
 
The third component consists of the awareness level within each plan. This component is 
arguably the most difficult to achieve as it requires investments in education and promotional 
initiatives. As detailed by multiple authors, there are two main tiers of which awareness plays 
a role in, namely, the higher-level, decision-making tier; and the lower-level, community-based 
tier. Awareness level in both tiers plays critical roles in post-disaster recovery as it is a process 
that requires input from both decision-makers and community members. Similarly, a scoring 
system of 0 to 2 is proposed for awareness level within each plan. A score of 2 will be given 
to the plan if it emphasises on the importance of educational and promotional initiatives. On 
the other hand, a score of 1 will be given if there are general comments about the matter. A 
score of 0 will be given if it is not identified in the documents. Table 3-6 below lists the scoring 
system for awareness level within the documents listed for review.  
 
Table 3-6 The table shows the scoring system for Component 3: Awareness level 
3  Raising awareness level in post-disaster recovery efforts    
 2 Explicit recognition to raising awareness level through educational and 
promotional activities   
 1 General recognition to the importance of raising awareness level    
 0 Not identified   
 
The fourth component involves the emphasis on collaboration within each plan. As mentioned 
by the Godschalk et al. (1999), collaboration amongst the stakeholders is an essential element 
in the post-disaster recovery process. Similar to the awareness level, this includes high-level 
intergovernmental collaborations, as well as collaborations at the community-level of the 
varying sectors. In order to evaluate this component, a score of 0 to 2 will be given to indicate 
the level of importance within each plan. If a plan explicitly states collaboration at both levels, 
a score of 2 will be given. If a plan gives a general idea of collaboration at either level, a score 
of 1 will be given. A score of 0 will be given If a plan does not specify collaboration at any 
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level. The table below summaries the scoring points for collaboration in the documents in Table 
3-7. 
 
Table 3-7 The table below identifies the key to Component 4: Collaboration 
4  Collaboration amongst the key stakeholders   
 2 Explicit recognition to the collaboration in a post-disaster recovery environment   
 1 General recognition to collaboration at either the decision-making level or 
community level or both 
 0 Not recognition to collaboration   
 
The fifth and final component considered in the policy and planning document review is the 
allocation of resources in the legislative environment. This can come in any forms of support, 
including human, financial and logistical support. This support often comes from 
organisational authorities that can include either the government or non-governmental bodies. 
To assess whether a plan has considered the allocation of resources in cases of an emergency 
event, a score of 0 to 2 is proposed to indicate the level within each plan. A score of 2 will be 
given if the plan emphasises on the allocating resources in an emergency environment. 
Conversely, a score of 1 is given if there is a vague recognition to the importance of allocating 
resources after a disaster. If a plan does not indicate or requires allocation of resources, a score 
of 0 is given. The table below summaries the scoring system for the allocation of resources in 
the documents reviewed. 
 
Table 3-8 The table below shows the key to Component 5: Allocation of resources 
5  Allocation of resources in a post-disaster recovery environment  
 2 Explicit recognition to the importance of resource allocation  
 1 General recognition to allocation of resources   




The following table summarises the results of the content analysis. The component scores of 
each document are weighted out of a total score of 10. This is to assist the overall comparison 
between the documents reviewed in recognising the five components. 
 
Table 3-9 The table below summarises the results of the content analysis. Component 1 stands for community participation. 
Component 2 stands for introducing the idea of resilience. Component 3 stands for raising awareness level. Component 4 





Document Component Total 
score 
 1 2 3 4 5   
Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response to the 
Great East Japan Earthquake (2012)  
2 1 1 2 2 8 
Act on Special Measures for the Reconstruction and 
Revitalisation of Fukushima (2012)  
1 2 2 2 2 9 
Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in Response to 
the Great East Japan Earthquake in the 













Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in response to 
the Great East Japan Earthquake (2011) 
1 2 1 2 2 8 
Outline of the System of Special Zone for 
Reconstruction (2011) 
1 1 1 1 2 6 
Towards Reconstruction “Hope beyond the 
Disaster” (2011)  
2 2 1 2 
 
1 8 
Resource Management Act (1991)  2 2 1 2 1 8 
Recovery Management- Director’s Guidelines for 
CDEM Groups (2005) 
2 1 1 2 1 7 
New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement (2010) 2 2 1 2 1 8 
National Civil Defence Emergency Management 
Plan Order (2015)  
1 2 2 1 2 8 
Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery Act 
(2016) 
2 2 1 2 1 8 
National Disaster Resilience Strategy (2019) 2 2 2 2 1 9 
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Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has presented an assessment of the policy and planning documents relevant to the 
recovery process in the Tōhoku and Kaikōura region. The Basic Act on Reconstruction in 
Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake (2012) governs the overall recovery process in 
Tōhoku. In the case of Kaikōura, the overarching legislation that specifically governed the 
Kaikōura recovery process was the Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquake Recovery Act (2016). Both 
legislative documents recognised the importance of community participation; raising 
awareness level; and promotes collaboration amongst the stakeholders. However, it appears 
that Tōhoku had a heavier emphasis on resource allocation while Kaikōura had a heavier 
emphasis on introducing the idea of resilience. Overall, as outlined in Table 3-9, the documents 
in place demonstrate reasonably high level of recognition to the community participation; idea 
of resilience; raising awareness level; collaboration; and resource allocation to the affected 
communities. Chapter 6 concludes the content analysis of these documents by examining these 
factors with reference to the informant interviews and academic literature findings.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
Introduction   
 
This chapter presents the qualitative methods utilised in the study to address the research 
questions. The key informant interviews alongside an analysis of policy and academic 
literature act as a foundation to inform the research.  
 
Research Approach  
 
This research project used a qualitative approach to achieve the aim of the study and to 
address the research questions. Interviews and focus groups were selected as they allow 
evaluation of the current post-disaster recovery framework through the perspectives of the 
key stakeholders involved. Primary research involves semi-structured interviews, a focus 
group and site observations of the study area. The secondary research method consisted of a 
literature review and an analysis of the policy and planning documents. The combination of 
these methods provided a platform for a comprehensive evaluation of the post-disaster 
recovery framework in Japan and New Zealand.          
      
Qualitative research quantifies human environments, individual experiences and social 
processes within social, cultural, economic, political, and environmental contexts (Hay, 
2010). It highlights the related issues and establishes a link between personal experiences and 
conceptual theories (Hay, 2010). Due to the nature of the research, this approach was chosen 
to create meaningful dialogues between the participants and the interviewer. It allows the 
researcher to fill in gaps that other methods like site observation and use of available data are 
unable to bridge adequately (Hay, 2010). It also provides access to a diverse range of 
information about opinions and experiences and allows reflection of individual experiences 
(Hay, 2010). 
 
The aim of the project is evaluating disaster planning frameworks and policies in Japan and 
New Zealand to identify whether improvements can be made to disaster management in New 
Zealand. This shaped the research design to answer the following research questions (Table 
4-1):   
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Table 4-1 The table below outlines the research questions of the study. 
Research Question 1  Is post-disaster management in Japan the state of the art? 
  
Research Question 2  What are the gaps and challenges of post-disaster recovery 
management? Are there ways through which they could be 
filled?  
 
Research Question 3  What is the best step forward to managing post-disaster 
recovery efforts?   
 
Participants were chosen for their expert knowledge and involvement in post-disaster 
management in either the Kaikōura or Tōhoku region. Participants from a wide range of 
backgrounds were sought to ensure broader representation of the varying perspectives of 
different participants (Table 5-2). As the field of work influence what the key informants say, 
they are split into four categories, specifically council staff (CS); consultants (C); 
Academia(A) and Other (K). There is also one focus group (C3); and it provided a platform 
for participants to bounce off ideas during the interviews and produce data in a collective 
space (Dal Forno et al., 2017).  
 
It is important to note that an Ethics A application was sought and approved for the field 
research around Tōhoku, Japan (included in appendix), while an Ethics B application was 




Table 5-2 List of Key Informants and their Field of Work 
Key 
Informant 
Council Staff (CS) Consultants (C) Academia 
(A) 
Other (K) 
1 Community Services 
and Development Team 
Previously: 
Planning Team 









2 Recovery Team Regional 
Relationships  
Professor  Business 
Chamber  








4 Planning Team  Environmental 
Assessment  
Team  
 Civil Defence 
Team  
5  Engineering 
Team   
  
 
Data collection     
         
Data collection was conducted prior to and during fieldwork in the Kaikōura Region (New 
Zealand) and Tōhoku Region from July 2019 to August 2019. Primary and secondary data 
were collected to inform the study. The Tōhoku and Kaikōura regions were chosen for the 
similarities in geographical and recovery contexts. An evaluation of the recovery framework 




Primary Research  
 
Twelve semi-structured interviews were conducted in Kaikoura, Christchurch, Queenstown, 
Sendai and Osaka; four interviews were conducted through Skype video calls and phone 
calls.  
 
Multiple scholars have conducted research on post-disaster recovery process through a 
qualitative research method. Chang et al. (2011) based their research on a combination of field 
observations, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. As part of their study, the data 
from the questionnaire survey were verified by the key informants from the interviews. This is 
to interpret the data collected and gain the perspectives of the informants on the findings 
yielded from the sorbet. Similarly, Oloruntoba et al., (2018) adopted a qualitative research 
strategy, but also carried out a case study approach to develop a framework to answer the 
research questions. In addition, they used an iterative triangulation strategy to link the findings 
from the study to the research questions for data interpretation and analysis. Karunasean et al. 
(2016) also adopted similar approach for their research. They collected data through interviews, 
case studies and surveys regarding post-disaster waste management.  
 
In this study, semi-structured interviews were conducted to allow for a more conversational 
approach. This triggers discussions and allows reflection of opinions and perspectives from 
the participants (DeLyser and Sui, 2014). The pre-structured questions were split into three 
main sections (included in Appendix):  
 
1. regulation and legislation;  
2. community response;  
3. way forward.  
 
It provides a guide and allows the interviewer to steer the interview into a specified direction 
while allowing insights into personal perceptions and personal histories of the participants 
(Entrikin and Tepple, 2006). The data collected from the interviews were analysed through 
text transcripts to seek out prominent themes. These key themes are coded and distilled to 
assist data analysis.  
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Site observations were carried out in Kensennuma and Kaikōura to gain an understanding of 
the recovery functions in both regions. This helped highlight the rebuild projects in each town 




As part of the background research to inform the research questions, an academic literature 
review of post-disaster recovery was done. This focussed on a broad array of factors which 
included the built, social, economic and natural environments. Accompanying was an 
analysis of the policies and planning documents regarding the post-disaster recovery 
frameworks in Tōhoku and Kaikōura (Table 3-1). 
 
Table 3-1 The table below lists the policies and planning documents reviewed. 
Japan New Zealand 
• Basic Act on Reconstruction in Response 
to the Great East Japan Earthquake (2012) 
• Act on Special Measures for the 
Reconstruction and Revitalisation of 
Fukushima (2012) 
• Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in 
Response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake in the “Reconstruction and 
Revitalisation Period (2016)  
• Basic Guidelines for Reconstruction in 
response to the Great East Japan 
Earthquake (2011) 
• Outline of the System of Special Zone for 
Reconstruction (2011) 
• Towards Reconstruction “Hope beyond 
the Disaster” (2011)  
• Resource Management Act (1991) 
• National Coastal Policy Statement (2010) 
• Recovery Management- Director’s 
Guidelines for CDEM Groups (2005) 
• National Civil Defence Emergency 
Management Plan Order (2015)  
• Hurunui/Kaikōura Earthquakes Recovery 
Act (2016) 




Ethical Considerations           
The interview process takes a semi-structured conservational approach and involves 
collecting data that might be personal and sensitive. Issues that are upsetting and potentially 
psychologically damaging may be raised during the interview. However, participants were 
reassured that the data collected is of their overall experience of the situation, rather than a 
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personal one. Informed consents were sought from the participants through consent forms, 
and information sheets were handed out to the participants and privacy and confidentiality is 
emphasised throughout the sheets to ensure the participants are comfortable with sharing 
their personal experiences. Interviews may unfold in an unpredictable nature, but this is 
compensated as the anonymity of the participants is maintained in the written report. 
 
The interviews were audio-recorded to assist with transcribing and writing up the report. It 
also allows the interviewer to focus on a conservational interview-style without the 
distraction of note-taking (Hay, 2010). It also allows more time to organise the next prompt 
to maintain the flow of the conversation (Hay, 2010). However, participants may inhibit 
responses while being recorded. However, they are reminded at the start of the interview, that 
this is to assist the researcher with writing and transcribing. As mentioned, the utmost effort 
will be kept to preserve the participants' anonymity. 
 
Permission was also obtained to undertake fieldwork in Japan from the University of Otago 
Human Ethics Committee through an Ethics A application. A participant information form 
and a participant consent form were produced as part of the ethics application. 
 
Positionality           
 
It is important to note that the results of this research are reflective of the recovery structures 
following the Tōhoku and Kaikōura Earthquake. Some elements can be transferable to any 
setting, but some aspects like socio-economic contexts are specific to the respective regions. 
There is no definite solution to managing post-disaster situations as it is highly context-
specific. In other words, the recommendations proposed in the research may not be directly 
applicable to other settings. The main findings and recommendations of this research provide 




Chapter 5: Post-disaster recovery framework in Tōhoku and 
Kaikōura 
 
This chapter examines the post-disaster recovery structure with reference to the key informant 
interviews conducted in Japan and New Zealand. The Tōhoku Earthquake and the Kaikōura 
Earthquake have been selected as case studies as they share similar post-disaster legislative 
structures, and in some ways, similar socio-economic contexts. A brief overview of the Tōhoku 
and Kaikōura regions is included to provide context to the chapter, as summarised in Table 5-
1.   
 
           Table 5-3: The Great Eastern Earthquake (Japan) vs. Kaikōura Earthquake (New Zealand) 
 Tōhoku 1 Kaikōura 2 
Date 11 March 2011 at 0546 
UTC 
13 November 2016 at 1102 
UTC  
Magnitude  9.0 7.8 
Affected area  Rural  Rural  
Scale of events • Earthquake 
• Tsunami  
• Nuclear accident 
• Earthquake 
• Tsunami  
Damage  Coastal areas damage by 
tsunami  
Surface deformation by 
earthquake  
Casualties 19451 (80% drowned) 2 
Economic damage ¥30tn or 6% of GDP $500m or 0.12% of GDP 3 
Economic Activities  Primary industries and 
tourism 4 
Primary industries and 
tourism  
1. Adapted from Hayashi (2012) 
2. Adapted from Cradock-Henry et al. (2018) 
3. Sourced from Ministry of Transport (2018) 




Overview of the Tōhoku Region  
 
The Tōhoku region is situated in the north-eastern portion of the Honshu Island in Japan. It 
accounts for 7.1% of the national population at with 8.98 million, by which the working-age 
and elderly groups make up the majority of the population (Tohoku Bureau of Economy, Trade 
and Industry, 2016). Overall, the region predominately consists of primary industries and 
contributes 6.3% to the Gross Domestic Product (Tohoku Bureau of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, 2016). Figure 5-1 below summarises the economic sectors around the region.  
 
 
Figure 5-1 This diagram shows the economic indicators for the Tōhoku Region. [adopted from Tohoku 
Bureau of Economy, Trade and Industry] 
In 2011, Tōhoku was hit by the largest ever mega-earthquake recorded in Japan that ruptured 
the undersea megathrust fault between the Pacific Plate and the North American Plate, 
triggering tsunami across Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures (Figure 5-2) (Stimpson, 
2011; Chini, 2013). The Tōhoku Earthquake caused many casualties and extensive structural 
damage to the Tōhoku coastline. The tsunami waves generated exceeded 10 m in height and 
reached up to 5 km inland from the Tōhoku coastline (Chini, 2013). Besides, several landslides 
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were also triggered by this earthquake, with some concentrated in the Fukushima and Miyagi 
Prefectures (Wang, 2014). There were also liquefaction effects extending throughout the 
Tōhoku and Tokyo Bay region (Chini, 2013; Kagawa 2015). The tsunami also resulted in 
power and water cut and blocked the corridors up with debris (McCurry, 2011). The three-fold 
event included the meltdown at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant Complex that 
resulted in the emission of radioactive materials in the air and the sea, displacing the residents 
(Hayashi, 2012; Aldrich, 2017). The economic damage that arose following the disaster had 
significant implications on the primary industries in Tōhoku, mainly agriculture, forestry and 
fishery.  
 
Figure 5-2 The diagram shows the affected prefectures in the Tōhoku region. [adopted from McCurry, 
2011] 
The Japanese Government proposed a recovery plan for the Tōhoku region, whereby a 
reconstruction agency was set up to manage the restoration projects. The first five-year period 
between 2011 and March 2016 was declared by the Japanese Government as the intensive 
reconstruction period (Rob and Yan, 2017). That consisted of both physical and social 
restoration and reconstruction, which includes community and industrial development in the 
region. Individual and industrial support has been provided to the affected communities. As of 
2017, the number of evacuees has decreased rapidly where a majority of evacuation orders 
lifted in the Fukushima Prefecture.  There are more than 140,00 of private and public houses 
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either being relocated to upland or rebuilt; 83% of tsunami-affected farmland restored; 92% of 
the fishery facilities resumed operation; and development of transportation network 
(Reconstruction Agency, 2017).  
 
From 2016 to 2020, the reconstruction and revitalisation period are allocated to further assist 
with the physical redevelopment in the region, with an emphasis on the social revitalisation for 
the affected communities. There is also significant tourism support to assist in the recovery 
process around the region (Reconstruction Agency, 2016). Conversely, there is a shift towards 
tertiary industries due to the reconstruction work in the region. The shift prompted economic 
growth in Tōhoku, mostly through wholesale and retail trade and construction (Tohoku Bureau 
of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2016). In terms of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plant, there is a decommissioning plan in place to address the risks of nuclear power in the 
region (Nuclear Regulation Authority, 2015). Figure 5-3 below summarises the progress of the 
reconstruction process around the region. 
 
 
Figure 5-3 The Process and Prospects for Reconstruction in Tōhoku shows the reconstruction progress 
in the region following the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake. [adopted from the Reconstruction Agency, 2017] 
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The governmental structure in Japan is based on a unitary system involving parties at the 
national, prefectural and municipal level (Furukawa, 2000). The Reconstruction Agency was 
established to accelerate the reconstruction process through reconstruction strategy and 
initiatives following the 2011 Tohōku Earthquake (Reconstruction Agency, 2019). At the 
national level, the Reconstruction Headquarters provides guidelines for reconstruction policies 
and measures, coordinate the reconstruction activities and provide financial and human 
resource support to the local governments (Reconstruction Agency, 2011). The Regional 
Offices for Reconstruction provide “one-stop service” whereby they provide guidance and 
assistance to the afflicted local governments (Government of Japan, 2012). Reconstruction 
planning occurs at a local level and has to be in line with the policies and guidelines set out by 
the national government (Reconstruction Agency, 2011). There are communication channels 
at all three levels, which also involves community participation and academic collaborations 
(Reconstruction Agency, 2011). Figure 5-4 below illustrates the recovery structure in the 
region following the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake.  
 
 
Figure 5-4 The Recovery Structure in Tōhoku. The diagram above illustrates the three-tiered system of the recovery structure in the region 
following the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake. It also outlines the key roles and functions at the national, prefectural and municipal level.  
  
National Level
Coordinating reconstruction activities and 
policies 
Prefectural Level
Coordinate and support recovery efforts
Municipal Level 
Manage the recovery process and involves 
community and economic development
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Overview of Kaikōura  
 
Kaikoura is located in the North Canterbury region of the South Island in New Zealand. It is 
bounded by an inland range to the west and the Pacific Ocean on the east (Cradock-Henry et 
al., 2018). The main economic driver in the region is tourism, and the primary industries consist 
of agriculture, forestry and fishing (Cradock et al., 2018). Kaikōura has a population of 
approximately 3,552 and accounts for less than 1% of the population in New Zealand (Stats 
NZ, 2013). The median age in Kaikōura is 45.6 years with 19.4% of residents aged 65 years 
and over (Stats NZ, 2013). 
 
In 2016, an earthquake occurred between the southern Hikurangi Subduction Zone and the 
continental collision along the Alpine Fault. The Kaikōura Earthquake was one of the largest 
ever instrumentally recorded earthquakes in New Zealand at an estimated moment magnitude 
(Mw) of 7.8 (Cesca et al., 2017; Gusman et al., 2018). The earthquake sequence initiated 
surface deformations that included uplift and surface ruptures both inland and offshore, which 
triggered a modest tsunami around the region (Cesca et al., 2017; Gusman et al., 2018). There 
were two fatalities alongside the extensive damage to many residential and commercial 
properties. The earthquake also led to road and rail closures due to a combination of landslips 
and uplift, which cut-off access into and out of Kaikōura (Hatton et al., 2017). In addition, 
there were disruptions to the water and power supplies and telecommunications around the 
region (Cradock-Henry et al., 2018). Aside from Marlborough, Hurunui and Kaikōura, 
Wellington was also affected by the earthquake in terms of structural damage and water supply 
(Figure 5-5) (Cradock-Henry et al., 2018). The event resulted in an ongoing disruption to the 
tourism and agricultural industries in Kaikōura, with estimates for repair and rebuild as high as 





Figure 5-5 This diagram illustrates the affected regions by the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake. [adopted 
from Hatton et al., 2017] 
 
An Order in Council has been signed to assist recovery from the Kaikōura Earthquake. This is 
a special legislation to remove the legislative barriers (e.g. resource consenting process) until 
March 2018, accelerating the rebuild for the reinstatement of State Highway 1 road and rail 
line, which was cut off post-earthquake (Ministry of Transport, 2018). There are also 
environmental, ecological and cultural elements within the special legislation to ensure that the 
relevant issues are addressed during the rebuild around the region (Hurunui/Kaikōura 
Earthquakes Recovery Review Panel, 2016). The project is managed by the North Canterbury 
Transport Infrastructure Recovery alliance, which was set up to restore the road and rail 
networks in the region (NZTA, 2019). The alliance is a partnership between the New Zealand 
Transport Agency, KiwiRail, Downer, Fulton Hogan, HEB Construction and Higgins (NZTA, 
2019). This provided communication channels at the national, regional and local level and 
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created a platform to develop relationship amongst the key stakeholders, and thus, improving 
resilience capacities around the region (Wotherspoon et al., 2018).  
 
There is national-level involvement for the recovery process in Kaikōura as it was declared a 
national emergency (Woods et al., 2017). At the national level, the emergency legislation 
established provides a governance structure, by which the central government coordinates 
short-, medium- and long-term recovery activities. During this transition period, there is an 
appointed recovery manager who manages recovery functions in the social, natural, economic 
and built environment (MCDEM, 2005; Woods et al., 2017). At the regional level, there have 
been prior strategic planning for recovery, which provided guidance and support to assist and 
create a more seamless recovery process in the region (MCDEM, 2016). The recovery 
functions are delegated to the regional and local authority and involve key stakeholders, 
including the local community in the region (MCDEM, 2016). Figure 5-6 below summarises 
the key roles and functions at the national, regional and local level.  
 
 
Figure 5-6 The diagram above illustrates the key functions and roles of the recovery process following 
the 2016 Kaikōura Earthquake  at the national, regional and local level. 
  
National Level
Provides a mandate through a legislative 
enviroment to create a governance structure 
for the recovery process 
Regional Level
Coordinate efforts and provides 
communication channels 
Local Level 
Management of the recovery process and 
includes NCTIR, the Kaikōura District Council, 
key stakeholders and the local communities
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Evaluating the recovery structures in Tōhoku and Kaikōura  
 
This section presents the findings from the key informant interviews. Due to the vast amount 
of data, this will be split and discussed in four main sections, namely, effects of local context 
on post-disaster recovery; comments on the legislative environment; effectiveness of post-
disaster recovery structure; and suggestions to managing future post-disaster events.  
 
Effects of local context on post-disaster recovery  
 
In a general sense, K3 felt that disaster management is very context-specific and further 
described how some aspects of disaster management needed a top-down approach (Figure 5-
7). K3 explained it using tsunami warnings as an example, whereby an international long-range 
tsunami detection system has to be in place before a national warning system. The informant 
further added how some aspects of disaster management like escape routes needed to be local. 
The level of assistance required, whether it be local, city, state, national or international, is 
highly dependent on the availability of resources and the local context concerning the social, 
economic and structural resilience, K3 said.  
 
 




“(Some aspects of disaster 
management) can be easily 
tackled with local protocols 
and system that don’t need 
national coordination.” 
“There is no single answer there, 
different countries, different 
disasters.” 
“(Comparing New York and New Orleans) shows 
you how specific (post-disaster recovery) is, to the 
type of event, and the city, the economy, its social 
structure. I don’t think there is sort of one shoe fits 
all kind of approach to the question”
“Some countries need a lot of assistance. It’s 
not a simple question of what the GDP… 
there are economic and social issues.” 
“I don’t think there is a 
good or bad solution 
about national, state, city 
level preparedness in 
disaster response. Any of 
them could work.” 
“(Technological constraint) is 
never the only constraint, 
there’s financial, social, etc.” 
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In the case of Kaikōura, C1 also described that the local context is essential. The informant 
described the post-disaster situation in Kaikōura. Since the staff were under much pressure in 
their own lives as well as working, it “puts a whole different framework on how you cope”, the 
informant said. C1 commented on the difference in the recovery process between Hurunui and 
Kaikōura. The informant stated that external support was necessary due to the lack of human 
resources in Kaikōura.  
 
“It was like living in a war-zone and you still had to 
function in this… because there was so much to do.” 
C1 
 
Also, C2 raised the point of considering the local context as well as the perspectives from the 
animals. Since Kaikōura is a farming district, it was important to get health care to the animals 
as they were impacted too, the informant said.  
 
“So, it’s wider than just the human the community is, 
you have to think about the different communities that 
are there, there’re farming communities, there’re urban 
communities, the tourism, the freight community. So, 
there’s all this community groups which have different 
needs and different requirements that you need to think 
about.” C2 
 
In the case of Tōhoku, A3 commented on how the local context affects the recovery process. 
There is prioritisation of financial aid by the Japanese Government based on the economic 
contribution of the cities, the informant said.  
 
“Because if (the Tōhoku Earthquake) happened in 
Osaka or Tokyo, they would make the recovery 




Both in Tōhoku and Kaikōura, many key informants commented on the complexities of the 
disasters. Figure 5-8 below illustrates some of the key comments on the scale of events by the 
informants on the Tōhoku and Kaikōura Earthquake.  
 
Figure 5-8 The diagram outlines the comments on the scale of events by the informants. 




In the case of Kaikōura, CS4 indicated that the established council regulations pre-disaster 
already provides a solid foundation to minimising and mitigating the effects of natural hazards. 
The informant suggested that significant resource consent process is required if development 
were to occur on an area identified as hazardous. However, CS4 questioned the value of the 
process. All that is required is to provide qualified evidence for the application to get through, 




"To a lesser extent, it wasn't so bad 
in Christchurch. Those in Kaikōura, 
we weren't in touch with al all." C5
“The disaster area’s huge. And also, in 
Tohoku, there’s the nuclear power 
plant, (making it) a complex disaster.” 
A3 
“We (Kaikōura) were 
absolutely cut off.” C1
“One of the biggest factors here that no 
other town in New Zealand has had was 




Figure 5-9 The diagram above shows the positive and negative comments of the pre-disaster legislation 
in place by CS4.  
 
In the Tōhoku context, A3 also mentioned that prior established regulations on tsunami 
restoration and recovery had minimised the effects of natural hazards. A3 described the 
legislative structure of the Japanese Government. Funding is provided mainly by the central 
government, but strategic plans are dependent on the local government via community 
engagement and involvement. The informant reinforced this by stating that Sendai, unlike 
multiple cities around the Japan Coast, has no massive tsunami walls. It is the decision of the 
local government on how they cope with disasters, A3 said. However, A3 added on stating that 
this is one of the reasons for the slow recovery process around the area.  
 
“Well, the central government mainly control the 
budget… but local government has their own control.” A3 
 
Advantages and disadvantages of the recovery structure  
 
As mentioned, national governmental support meant that a governance structure is placed upon 
the affected communities. Key informant interviews revealed that the recovery legislation 
established following the Tōhoku and Kaikōura Earthquake had both positive and negative 
impacts on the recovery process in the respective regions (Figure 5-10). A few of the key 
informants applauded the emergency legislative environment, particularly in terms of the faster 
consent process. C5 felt like there was a “massive turnaround with consents”. The informant 
added on though “we could push something quick but doesn’t mean that we would” and said 
that the design process was dealt with judiciously. C5 further mentioned that the Order in 
Council created a restoration liaison group consisted of DOC, NZTA, KiwiRail, local Iwi, 
“(Areas being identified as
being hazard prone)
immediately throws up
significant barriers to actually
being able to develop that
land.” CS4
"When it comes to fault-line,
it’s kind of ridiculous scenario
that we’ve got, if a line
drawn 15 years ago, on your
property in a residential area,
and not your neighbour’s
property, it has no
significance to their resource
consenting process, and a
very significant effect on your
process.” CS4
 60 
Hurunui Council, Marlborough District Council, Kaikoura District Council, Fish and Game, 
and other key stakeholders involved with the recovery process. K1 applauded the legislative 
environment, which allowed the road and control authority to get the consents and decisions 
passed for the rebuild works without any delays. CS2 also praised the Order in Council and the 
power it gives to the recovery manager, who is crucial during the transition period. Both C2 
and C3 applauded the alliance in Kaikōura and that it provides a platform for effective 
communication and information exchange.  
 
Figure 5-10 The figure outlines the key comments on the resource consenting process as a result of the 
introduction of the  Order in Council in Kaikōura. 
.  
Recovery structure and time constraint  
 
C4 shared similar views to C5 and K1, but raised the fact that minimal environmental impact 
assessment was what has allowed for a quicker resource consent application process. The 
council could only impose conditions to the applications; they could not refuse the applications, 
C4 said. The informant further stated that time was a significant factor in terms of the 
consenting process. “It was that trade-off between having to build something within a certain 
budget and timeframe versus having strong mitigation measures,” C4 said. Similarly, C3 
commented on the streamlined consenting process with the Order in Council but also felt like 
the environmental assessment were more of a “tick boxes exercise”. The application was going 
to be processed regardless of the effects, C3 said. C3 felt like the process was “so fast-tracked” 
Resource consent 
process 
“While it was much quicker, (the 
restoration liaison group) had 
indicated a lot of the advice, they 
get to have input and feedback.” 
C5
“It wouldn’t happened so quickly; we wouldn’t have 
gotten (the rebuild) done in time. We wouldn’t have 
achieved the road being opened so quickly and the 
railway being opened. If we had to wait for the 
normal resource consent process, which isn’t so 
quick, it takes months.” K1
“(The legislation) recommends that you have 
a team leader under (the Recovery Manager) 
to look after natural hazards, there’s welfare 
and finance... (and rural).” CS2 
 61 
that there was “no luxury” to go in and do the environmental assessments to understand the 
values of the natural systems around the construction site. Additionally, C2 and C5 brought up 
the time pressure of the rebuild process.  
 
CS3 also mentioned the truncated resource consent process and had a similar outlook. “It was 
a three-day process, not a three working day process” CS3 added. The informant said that the 
key thing in recovery was assessing the consents against the legislation. This essentially meant 
that the council could flag certain bits and pieces but had to grant the resource consent to allow 
their works of the rebuild of the state highway, CS3 said. CS3, CS4 and C4 all raised concerns 
about the long-term effects from the short-term benefits of emergency protocols. National 
government support is required. However, it is difficult if “you’re just cutting red-tape and 
basically making it to people that people don’t need to consider fundamental matters that are 
important before the disaster, just because there’s been a disaster, doesn’t mean these matters 
aren’t important anymore” CS4 said. The time pressure also made it difficult for the 
coordination of the resource consent application amongst the different teams involved in the 
rebuild projects. There are difficulties of waste correction and transportation when there is a 
time limit, A2 said. C1 commented on how the government was eager to wrap the recovery 
process partly due to financial factors. To illustrate, the table below summarises the key quotes 




Table 5-4 The table below outlines the key comments on the recovery structure in Kaikōura. It shows 
the impacts of the time constraints on the recovery process in Kaikōura.  
Rebuild works vs long-term impacts  
C2 “So, typically, a strategic case could take somewhere between 6 and 8 months. We did it in a 
week. A programme business case sort of takes 6 to 8 months, we did it in 5 weeks. So, when 
it’s disaster recovery, it’s about speed” 
 “It’s just we didn’t have the time to dot the ice across the tease, and do the consultation stuff, 
and that’s why I brought industry experts together, and we debated it, and challenged it, and 
move forward.” 
C3 “It was a very challenging and difficult space to work in, compared to what we normally do. I 
think because the timeframe in particular that we were working to, born alluded to the fact that 
we were building things before they had been designed and before they had been consented.”  
 “It was a very challenging and difficult space to work in, compared to what we normally do. I 
think because the timeframe in particular that we were working to, born alluded to the fact that 
we were building things before they had been designed and before they had been consented.”  
C4 “I wouldn’t call it environmental recovery of such, it’s just construction really, and 
management of ecological effects during construction.”  
 “When somebody has worked on one aspect and somebody on the other, at the end they have 
to meet and make sure design works for both aspects and that wasn’t necessarily the case, and 
things had to be redone, but because there was such a tight timeframe, people had to work on 
things simultaneously.”  
 “It was really important to open that corridor, if there was a question on what was more 
important, that’s the one that really trumps.”  
C5 “That’s been the background of 3 ¾ billion dollars’ worth of work. I would’ve liked to have 
some people helped us out. But it was m and another KiwiRail engineer and one NZTA 
engineer. That was pretty full on we had to make those call so quick.” 
CS3 “We had projects up and down the coast to get the road opened, and we have effectively 
undertaken earthworks prior to the design being completed, just to allow the project to speed 
the construction of the project.”  
 “So, effectively, it was a process where the council review the application [within three days], 
the road and control authority would accept or reject the comments the council made, and then 
council would issue a decision based on what the roading authority had stated. So, it was a 
very truncated process.”  
CS4 “(Disaster management) not necessarily meeting the desired outcomes of the emergency 
legisltaion and also having some undesirable planning outcomes becasue group planning was 




Recovery structure and local community  
 
C1 also applauded the recovery legislation and said it was effective in getting in regional and 
national resources into an emergency affected area. It is a rigorous governance structure, but it 
lacks a “local voice”. Hurunui got away with it because they refused the government’s funding 
on that basis, the informant said. C1 further raised the point that the funding meant a 
restructuring of local council staff with the introduction of government-funded staff on the 
rebuild projects. Figure 5-11summarises the key quotes made by C1 on the implications of the 
recovery legislation in Kaikōura.  
 
Figure 3-11 The diagram above illustrates the comments made by C1 on the recovery structure in 
Kaikōura. The informant mentioned that the recovery legislation failed to acknowledge the local level 
thinking. 
 
On the other hand, CS1 expressed dissatisfaction with the top-down management approach in 
Kaikōura. CS1 described that the rigorous structure came with financial assistance, but it 
affected the recovery process in Kaikōura. Hurunui was much more flexible for their disaster 
recovery and recovered much quicker than Kaikōura did, CS1 said. The informant raised the 
point that Hurunui is in a better financial position than Kaikōura is, which ultimately affected 
the recovery process. K2 also commented on the external top-down support and is uncertain 
about the long-term impacts of it. 
 
“We did ask for some financial help from the central 
government and what we learned is be careful what you asked 
for.” CS1 
 
A1 commented on the legislative implications and the power it comes with when a state of 
emergency is declared. However, the informant added how there are significant responsibilities 
“You tend to get a lot of people in 
that space that are ex-military 
and are really efficient, but they 
don’t take into account the social, 
the cultural, the local kind of 
environment.” 
“It’s pretty much a non-
collaborative process.”
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at the local level. There are conflicts between the national and local government, but there are 
no simple solutions, A1 said.  To illustrate, figure 5-12 summarises the key quotes made by the 
informant on the postivies and negatives of the governance structure.  
 
“Regional groups know their regions best… but sometimes, a regional group 
isn’t going to cope with a South Island wide event, they need to be able to 
coordinate across those groups… (Governance structure) criticised about 
being top-down in terms of central government coming in and starting to 
impose on how they go, but it’s never perfect post-disaster. I don’t think 




Figure 5-12 The diagram above illustrates the comments on the governance structure made by A1. The 
informant raised the positives and negatives of having a national governance structure in place to assist 
in the recovery process.  
 
Recovery structure and disaster waste management  
 
K3 described the high volume of waste a disaster generates and emphasised on the importance 
of disaster waste management. The streets have to be cleared off in order to get help from the 
responders, K3 said.  
 
“You get 10 years’ worth of waste in one day… It’s 
mixed. Some of it is useful, you want to save, some 
of it is highly toxic.” K3 
 
“A lot of responsibilities 
(given to CDEM groups) 
to look after their own 
regions, because they 
know, they understand 
their people, they know 
their local context and so 
they’re best placed to 
understand the risks they 
face in their own region.” 
“These fly in groups are 
seen as dropping in and 
in charge here and take 
over. And that will not 









A2 described the waste categorisation system and the complexity of it by the Japanese local 
government. There are different regulations by different ministries for the different type of 
wastes produced, and it made it difficult for the treatment of disaster waste, the informant said. 
 
Effectiveness of the post-disaster recovery structure  
 
The previous section outlined the results on the relationship between local contexts and the 
post-disaster recovery framework. This section will present the findings in terms of the 
effectiveness of the post-disaster recovery structure. This will be discussed in two main sub-
sections; exploring the solutions that people are working on, and examining some the 
constraints hindering the implementations of those solutions? 
 
Solutions that people are working on 
 
Comments on capacity and connectivity  
 
CS4 talked about the preventative measures currently being undertaken with regards to 
building standards, hazardous area identification, and building redundancies into the 
transportation networks and major services in case of isolation. K4 also suggested that “what 
we've got isn’t broken” and said that there should be more of a focus on reduction works, which 
includes building capacity in terms of structural standards, the informant said.  
 
C5 brought up how connectivity was necessary with recording and assessing the damage post-
earthquake. The informant explained how incorporating technology (e.g. iPads) into the 
recording system provides more functionality where reports are more streamlined and 
meaningful than paper-based reports. Besides, K1 commented on the connectivity the North 
Canterbury Transport Infrastructure (NCTIR) Alliance provide. The Alliance allowed recovery 
work to be conducted in the most efficient manner, the informant said. In terms of local 
businesses, K2 also brought up the benefits of businesses working collectively to assist the 
recovery process in Kaikōura. Figure 5-13 below illustrates the comments on connectivity by 
K1 and K2.  
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Figure 5-13 The diagram above illustrates the key quotes by K1 and K2 on the importance of 
connectivity in a recovery environment. The reconstruction process in Kaikōura provided a platform 
that links up multiple businesses which would not have happened otherwise.   
Also, K4 emphasised on the importance of developing “high trust working relationships” with 
the key stakeholders pre-disaster. We rely on key relationships around the board for human 
resources, K4 said. The informant also raised the point that navigators play in a pivotal role in 
the recovery process. The navigators are people the community trusted, which encouraged the 
community to talk about the issues they are facing. This helped the community to be in charge 
of their recovery, K4 said. In the Tōhoku context, A2 also shared similar views with K4 on 
forming relationships when it comes to post-disaster management (Figure 5-14). A2 described 
that the “window” into the local and prefectural government acted as a conduit between the 
government and the researchers, who were both needing information about managing disaster 
wastes. The informant added that this prompted the central government to develop a more 
streamlined and efficient tool of communication called D-waste Net.  
 
Figure 5-14 The diagram shows the importance of establishing relationships amongst the key 
stakeholders is crucial  for post-disaster management, as mentioned by K4 and A2.  
Developing 
connectivity 
“In the normal business-as-usual 
world, we’re competitors, but 
here, we work together and 
share and that’s what you do.”  
K1
“You pull together what you need, 
and you’ve got all these different 
minds from all these different 
companies that have come 
together.” K1 
“That was a different way for 
the businesses to work and to 
work collectively to deliver 
that, rather than on an 
individual space.” K2 
“If you haven’t got good 
relationships before it turns to 
mud, trying to develop 
relationships in a middle of a 
crisis, it’s a nightmare crisis, 
don’t ever, and really test good 
relationships sometimes.” K4
“Local government trusts me, 




Comments on field experts  
 
C5 raised the importance of having field experts when it comes to post-disaster management. 
The informant recalled how prior disaster experiences had better equipped the team in 
Kaikōura to cope with the 2011 earthquake. In order to get the railway reopened, assessing and 
recording the size and scale of the damage was crucial before construction began. Sending 
crews out for small fixes is not going to make any difference to how quickly the road is going 
to reopen, and it was a dangerous and uncontrolled area, the informant said. Similarly, C2 
recalled on the benefits of prior experiences in alliancing, which helped with the establishment 
of NCTIR in Kaikōura. The informant also mentioned that having a capable and competent 
support team is essential when it comes to post-disaster management, as exemplified in Figure 
5-15.   
 
 
Figure 5-15 This diagram illustrates the key comments made by C2 and C5 who mentioned the 
importance of prior experiences of C2 and C5. The informants stated that this allowed better 
management of the recovery efforts in Kaikōura. C5 raised the importance of initial damage assessment 





“We had (earthquake 
monitoring system) prior 
to the Kaikōura one, what 
they need to do, what to 
look at. I’ve written a 
standard on how to 
respond to an 
earthquake.” C5
“SCRIT staff was 
helpful. Some of it 
wasn’t appropriate 
for NCTIR but it was 
outweighed by lots 
of good experiences 
from good people.” 
C5
“(Alliance) There are 
different clients 
having different 
levels of expertise 
and experiences, 
and there is a level 
of service you’d 
want to build to.” C2
“We pull a number of people 
that we know are high-
performance and set up a 
response team… focussing on 
safety of our workers… and 
the public around 
communications and 
engagement and technical 
response and reconnecting 
people who are stranded.” 
C2 
“Because of our alliancing 
experience, when the 
earthquake happened back in 
November 2016, we knew that 
when SH1 was closed in 
Kaikōura, we knew that we had 
to mobilise pretty quickly to 
reinstate the SH. But we also 
knew that the railway had been 
devastated as well.” C2
“We know from the 
past, you need an 
accurate what is out 
there, what are the 
issues.” C5
“Understand how to 
attack this, don’t go 




Comments on resource availability  
 
C5 also applauded the amount of human resources provided for the construction management 
process by the NCTIR alliance. This contributed to the development of a new level of service 
and principle requirements and standards, the informant said. CS2 also applauded NCTIR for 
their contribution to the recovery of the local community by keeping the hospitality industry 
alive during the period of isolation. The workers occupied the available accommodation and 
had meals prepared by the local cafes and restaurants, the informant said.  
 
In addition, CS1 emphasised on the importance of developing a well-functioning community 
space pre-disaster. This is so that during or post-disaster, the community would have access to 
all the community services at times of crisis to support the social and environmental recovery, 
the informant said. K2 also commented on the lack of a well-established community space in 




Figure 5-16 The diagram illustrates the key informants’ comments on the benefits of having adequate 





“I think the fact that the locals 
(council staff) make the decisions 
and who does what is a really 
good idea because they know the 
strengths and weaknesses of the 
community.” CS1 
"In Kaikōura, because we didn’t have 
any business association or anything 
like that, so it was a matter of 
everyone getting in a room and 
working with all the business and 
putting together databases and 
working with them from there.” K2
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Comments on communication measures 
 
C4 described that the line of communication between NCTIR and the key stakeholders were 
“tightly regulated”. This was necessary due to the vast scope of organisations and people 
involved in the Kaikōura reconstruction project, the informant said. C4 added that it is more 
about delivering a core message by NCTIR as an organisation, as opposed to “different views 
from different organisations or individual representatives”. Figure (5-17) below lays out the 
comments made by C4 on the communication channels of the NCTIR alliance.  
 
 
Figure 5-17 The diagram above summarises the key quotes made by C4 on the communication channels 
during the recovery phase in Kaikōura. Due to the nature of the reconstruction project in Kaikōura, 
communication channels were regulated to ensure effective management of the restoration process. 
 
Similarly, C3 felt that the lines were tightly regulated but also felt like it was needed due to the 
scale of public interests (Figure 5-18). The informants praised NCTIR for their interaction with 
the community. They did really well in a really small community, and it was needed given the 
scale of the project, C3 said. 
 
Comments on the 
communication 
channels by C4 
“Sometimes, you might not agree 
with a decision, but you just have 
to pull an organisational line and 
understand that was required… 
there’s a bigger picture… it’s not 
about individual use.” 
“It would be counter-
productive if everybody went 
out and voice their own view 
on something to the 
stakeholders.” 
“We were invited to specific 
(meetings) where we would talk 
about something specifically, like 
amenity areas or various aspects of 
the design… the whole 
communication went through the 
channels that NCTIR had allocated.” 
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Figure 5-18 The diagram above outlines the key comments made by C3 on the communication channels 
during the recovery phase in Kaikōura. As there is much publicity surrounding the reconstruction 
project, the communication  channels had to be monitored. 
 
C5 praised Civil Defence and NZTA on the excellent work that they had done in terms of 
distributing information. One of the examples was the office setup for the NCTIR Alliance. 
Having the Alliance meant that KiwiRail staff were in the same office as NZTA, which gave 
us a link into what is going on, the informant said. C5 added that recovery centres should not 
be too detached from the people out in the field. “So, when they return from the day, they can 
see what’s being recorded,” C5 said. Also, in terms of communication measures, the informant 
described that the NCTIR Alliance had developed a system that includes risk assessment to 
keep the workers safe. There was whiteboard set up with maps and photos, satellite phones, 
emergency beacons and emergency packs with food, blankets and cell phone chargers. This is 
to ensure that the workers are aware of the measures in place to keep them safe, the informant 
said. C5 also talked about how newsletter from NCTIR was good in keeping the community in 
the loop. 
 
Similarly, K4 mentioned that they were producing situation reports to a wide range of 
stakeholders at the national level, the regional level and the local level. This informed the 
community and stakeholders of what has been done, what are some of the gaps at the time, the 
informant said. K4 also described the value of having face-to-face conversations with external 
Comments on the 
communication 
channels by C3
“I felt very much like 
cogs in a wheel. It was 
a very strict hierarchy 
of who could talk to 
who.” 
“I first knew a lot of it 
was through a media, 
rather than through 
the project.” 
“I think it was necessary for that, but I have 
never worked in such a hierarchical structure 
in that way, and I can see why that they didn’t 
want multiple people saying multiple things 
with very tight lines of communication.” 
“We reported to (our 
environmental manager), 
but what went on 
beyond her, I had very 
little visibility on that.” 
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organisations (Figure 5-19). There were regular community meetings between the two affected 
townships, which was essential for information distribution and exchange, the informant said.  
 
 
Figure 5-19 The diagram illustrates the key comments made by K4. There were communications 
amongst the key stakeholders ensure information distribution and exchange, which was critical for 
post-disaster recovery process. 
 
CS2 also talked about the line of communication at a local, regional and national level. This 
informant applauded communication from the national government and that they were quick 
to respond. In addition, the informant said it was essential to bring in key people like insurance 
and EQC to address the people’s concerns. In particular, there would be regular meetings that 
the council would hold to feed the information out to the general public. CS2 talked about 
holding expos consisting of key departments from a variety of agencies such as insurance and 
health departments to ensure that the community had a space for questions and for what is 
going on in Kaikōura. There were station set ups (e.g. booths for insurance; booths for council 
etc.), and that was a more effective way of getting the information out there, CS2 said. 
 
(On regular meetings) “The important thing was to 
keep feeding, even if it’s the information that you 







“What we did, we got (key 
stakeholders) together, because in 
many ways, they’re interlinked… 
(it would be risky if we) mapped 
them as little silos."
“We didn’t expect (the 
community) to come to us, 
what we did was we made 
a point of going to them.” 
“It’s convenient having those 
separate environments, but you 
need to get people in charge of 
those environment in a room 
together, otherwise it’s a 
disjointed recovery.” 
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Furthermore, CS3 highlighted that the Order in Council created the Restoration Liaison Group, 
which included the key stakeholders and agencies involved in the recovery process, including 
cultural advisors. That acted as an effective forum for information flow and exchange amongst 
the stakeholders to discuss and voice their perspectives on the recovery process. K1 also raised 
the importance of communicating at the local level. This is so the community feels like the 
NCTIR Alliance is part of them to make sure everyone is on the same page through community 
meetings, newsletters and social media to target all demographics, the informant said. K1 said 
that it’s about “finding a balance act” with the stakeholders involved. The informant said that 
it could be time consuming, but the Restoration Liaison Group opened up the line of 
communication between NCTIR and the community, including archaeologists and the cultural 
advisory group. 
 
(On distributing reconstruction updates to 
the public) “We’ll do anything to get 
information out so that people feel 
informed.” K1 
 
A1 emphasised that communication and good public relations management is vital in the 
recovery process. The informant talked about engaging the public and building awareness 
through social media as part of the pre-disaster work. C2 also highlighted the importance of 
communications at the local level. This gave the community assurance and confidence that 
NZTA was “doing everything possible to help them”, the informant said. C2 also applauded 
Civil Defence on their efforts to distribute the information and keeping everyone in the loop. 
Besides, CS1 applauded the regular community meetings as they provided a platform for the 
community to voice their councils and for the council to collect the information they needed. 
K2 also talked about how the regular meetings provided a platform to address the challenges 
and concerns the businesses are facing. 
 
(On community engagement) “They know that people 
are there trying to reinstall the critical 
infrastructure… and this gives people confidence that 
something is being done about it… but also the 
confidence that we’re her to help.” C2  
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In the international context, K3 emphasised on working at a local scale through local NGOs on 
disaster work, strategy development, stakeholder analysis and engagement on disaster wastes. 
The informant raised the importance of community engagement when it comes to developing 
plans on post-disaster management.  
 
(Developing strategies and policies) “It was built on 
stakeholders discussion, not just high in the sky UN 
strategy, not what federal wanted, but built on 
existing community need and priority.” K3 
 
Constraints to implementing solutions    
 
Comments on human resources  
 
CS4 suggested that it would be more helpful if the national government provided additional 
resources to the local authorities in case of emergencies, rather than introducing an emergency 
legislative environment. C5 also commented on the resourcing issue. There was a massive 
amount of information that had to be distributed on top of the normal workload, the informant 
revealed. In terms of the information distributed, the informant further described that it is 
crucial that they are up-to-date and of relevance. Figure 5-20 summarises the key comments 
made by CS4 and C5 regarding the implications of limited resources in the post-disaster 





Figure 5-20 The diagram above illustrates the comments on resourcing issues by CS4 and C5. Human 
resources is one of the key constraints listed by the informants to post-disaster recovery process. An 
emergency legislative environment provides additional support in a short space of time, but it also 
means that the council would have to cope with the loss of support after the transition period. Besides, 
the low number of human resources at the initial phase of the rebuild phases was evident in the lack of 
information distribution. C5 also stated that it was crucial that relevant and useful information was 
distributed to the right person.   
 
K4 shared similar views with CS4 and C5. Due to limited human resources, it also means that 
post-disaster management is more reactive, rather than proactive, the informant said. Similarly, 
CS3 described how the short space of time made things “a bit reactive”. There were immediate 
problems needed to be resolved in terms of general day-to-day Civil Defence type of things, 
ensuring buildings are safe for people to occupy, assessing damaged properties, deciding where 
infrastructure will be going, and rebuilding; then, there was a need for special legislation, and 
a lot was going on at the same time, the informant said. Furthermore, A1 described that 
community engagement from public submissions and feedback are ad hoc and tend to have a 
short-term focus. The informant explained how community engagement for long-term issues 
like climate change and disasters require significant human resources which could be difficult 
for smaller councils like Kaikōura to achieve.  
 
In addition, C1 also mentioned that the staff at Kaikōura District Council would have to 
multitask because of its small size. Likewise, CS1 expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of 




“During a disaster, everything 
is thrown at it. Post-disaster, 
you end up with a bit of a 
vacuum that’s just left to that 
community, and what’s left of 
it, to try to claim up and 
restore life as normal. That’s a 
really big job… that needs to be 
addressed but it’s expensive” 
CS4
“I don’t think it’s 
necessarily a fault with the 
district plan or framework 
that they have in place, but 
the actual ability or 
manpower or whatever to 
cope with the enormous 
workload to get through in 
the short amount of time 
post-disaster.” CS4
“Some of them were 
hesitant to sharing the 
information, we weren’t 
getting as much back in 
the same level of detail. 
Some of it was because 
we thought they had a 
big team.” C5
“(In terms of updates) You 
have to have the resources 
to do that, you have to 
have the system where 
people willingly know to 
call in, and obviously useful 
things to them, otherwise, 
you’re just providing 
updates for the sake of it.” 
C5
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the country because of its geographic location, the informant said. Moreover, K4 reflected on 
the recovery process in Kaikōura and brought up how the massive turnover of staff negatively 
affected the recovery process. CS2 also talked about how the senior management staff played 
a big role in the recovery process. The informant brought up how some council staff members 
were not on the same page, but it was not a significant issue. Equally, K2 made a comment on 
the council staff. Table 5-3 below summarises the key quotes made by C1, CS1 and K2 to 
illustrate the effects of human resources on the recovery process in Kaikōura.  
  
Table 5-5 The table below outlines the key comments made by the informants on issues regarding 
human resources. 
Comments on human resources  
C1 “Being a small council, you sort of learn to be a multi-tasker, like I did five or six roles, I 
didn’t just do one role.” 
CS1 “Because we’re on the brink of Marlborough, West Coast and Canterbury, we share our 
services… you’ve got to know where your people are.” 
K2 “Councillors don’t necessarily have that expertise, they were voted in for totally different 
reasons, not for disaster management.” 
 
Comments on community wellbeing 
 
C1 talked about the staff’s wellbeing and that they had to “work 12 to 14 hours a day and not 
be able to live a normal life”. C2 also raised the point of the wellbeing of the construction and 
emergency workers, that they also had their own families to care for. Likewise, CS4 reflected 
on the psychological scarring and stress of the staff involved with disaster management and 
that they had to put other people’s need above theirs. In addition, K4 mentioned how the 
community had been walloped by the recent event, especially when they were still recovering 
from the previous event. The informant added on that “elderlies won’t complain”, and the 
reality was often worse that they had described. K4 said it is vital to support the community as 
they will make a difference of how they feel mentally, which could be reflected in the recovery 
process. The table below outlines some of the key comments by the informants on the 
community and workers’ wellbeing in a post-disaster environment.  
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Table 5-6 The table below shows the comments made by the informants on the wellbeing of the 
workers and community after a disaster. There are psychological impacts from a disaster and as 
mentioned by the key informants, these are some of the issues needed to be addressed.  
Comments on community wellbeing   
C2 “The firemen, the drivers, the construction workers, they were there to assist the community, 
but actually, they’ve got their own family too that they need to care and look after… and it 
takes a toll on the family”  
 
CS4 “(Community wellbeing) is something that needs to be prioritised to providing services, 
whether financial or psychological. It’s all too often a vacuum.”  
K4 (On the community being affected by multiple disasters) “Slam dunk three years in a row is 
pretty tough.” 
 
Comments on financial resources  
 
CS1 said that the recovery framework is a “great thing if it comes with a price tag” and 
commented on the lack of money. The informant further described the impact once the recovery 
team and the council merged after the transition period. There were no jobs for the recovery 
team, everyone left, and all the knowledge was lost. There was little support from other 
government agencies, but they had no money, the informant said. CS1 added that the 
significant financial contribution from the central government was to resume the economic 
activity across the country, and the support for human resources was disproportionate 
compared to the support for the infrastructure construction.  
 
C1 shared similar views with CS1. The informant mentioned that financial capability 
profoundly impacts post-disaster management. Part of the reason why support was cut off was 
that the recovery team was costing the council financially, the informant said. K2 also 
commented on the need for resources for the council and the current council structure. 
 
Comments on communication measures  
 
C1 also expressed dissatisfaction of the communication between the senior management staff 
and the public. The informant commented on how the council did not take the community’s 
voice into account. It felt that there was “strategic miscommunication” from the council’s part 
and the isolated situation Kaikōura was in did not help, the informant said. Similarly, C5 
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Figure 5-21 The diagram above shows the comments on the communication issues by C1 and C5. As 
mentioned by the key informants, there are communication issues at the management level as well as 
the community level. There seems to either be a lack of communication or miscommunication amongst 
the government agencies.  
 
CS1 gave mixed reviews towards external support from various non-profit organisations to the 
Kaikōura District Council. The informant revealed that some of the organisations were helpful 
and kept the recovery team “in the sync”. Some organisations could have been a bit more 
helpful by tailoring their questions for the affected communities with the councils, the 
informant stated. In addition, CS3 also pointed out the value of having everyone in one place 
for communication purposes but mentioned how that was not a significant issue.  
 
“I think there were catch-ups, but in some ways, because the 
building wasn’t big enough to have (the business-as-usual 
team and recovery team) on the same level of the building, it 
may be a little bit fragmented, only a little bit… In an ideal 
world, you would have everyone in the same office… but 






“There’s things I’d say a lot of the senior 
management staff got really good of not 
communicating well with the public, and 
the elective members are hearing a very 
diluted truth and I don’t feel like they 
know what’s exactly going on. There’s 
been a COMS team put together at the 
council, but I feel like less information is 
coming out than ever before, and it’s all 
very sanitised.” C1 
We presented the 
data to (the council), 
but nothing changed.” 
C1 
“(In terms of communicating 
with the government 
agencies) So, you’re 
answering the same 
questions, three times, but in 
a slightly different one, rather 
than all at once.” C5 
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C2 also talked about how the community is a crucial stakeholder but said that “you also need 
to think upwards as well”. The informant described that the governance structure involves the 
national, regional and local government and is tailored to all the stakeholders. This is essential 
for information distribution and makes it clear what the roles and responsibilities are between 
the different levels regarding issues like budget, health and safety programme, risks, 
stakeholder engagement, network and performance, the informant said. 
 
“When anything turns to custard, it’s 
normally down to poor 
communication right?” C2 
 
CS4 mentioned how the communications between the council and the key stakeholders seem 
to be “ad hoc” but said that it is improving and there seems to be more “organisation and 
regularity being built into those relationships”.  The informant described that there should be 
regular meetings to better prepare for disaster situations. There is an outreach to the public, but 
the uptake from the community is low, the informant said (Figure 5-22). 
 
 
Figure 5-22 This diagram reveals the complexity between community engagement and community 
involvement as public outreach does not necessarily translate into public uptake. 
Comments on awareness and perceptions  
 
CS1 said that some government agencies are not aware of the issues that were going on at a 
local level and emphasised on how the six-months recovery period was too short as Kaikōura 
was still isolated. The informant also mentioned that some the issues could have been dealt 
with better (Figure 5-23). CS4 also brought up that it was essential to raise the awareness level 
of the council staff to better prepare for when an event strike. 
“They did a survey afterwards to see 
how many knew about (the 
community disaster plan), or read it, it 
was really low. I think 1/7 or 6 
something like that.”  CS4
“If that level of engagement, going in and 
providing a document like (community 
disaster plan) to people doesn’t work, it’s 
difficult to think what would, other than 




Figure 5-23 This diagram shows the comments made by CS1 on the awareness and perceptions of the 
management staff. As mentioned by the key informant, the rural context of Kaikōura had to be taken 
into account. The informant also stated that the transition period should have been extended 
considering how the local community is still struggling to recover from the disaster.  
 
In the Tōhoku context, A3 brought up how geological records could inform the height of the 
tsunami. However, decision-makers tend to depend on historical tsunamis, as they deemed 
geological record "unreliable because the record is the 9th century". As a consequence, they 
underestimated the height of the tsunami, the informant said. The informant also talked about 
how the community had a false sense of security from the big tsunami walls, thinking that it is 
going to protect them, which did not help when the Japan Meteorological Agency 
underestimated the tsunami height. A3 also commented on the communication between 
different disciplines, advising decision-makers and preparing for future disasters with the idea 
of resilience and the cost of recovery (Figure 5-24). Furthermore, A2 mentioned how the 
central government provides directions and guidelines for managing disaster wastes. The 
informant reflects on how it is important that decision-makers are aware of disaster waste, and 






“We need to not just 
throw the baby out into 
the bathwater, it was 
much too soon.”  
“We had (senior management 
staff) brought in with their big 
city ideas, big city finance, big 
city everything. So, it went 
totally over-budget, and we 
were screwed financially, 
because we had all these 




Figure 4-24 The diagram above demonstrates the comments made by A3 on the awareness level  of the 
management staff and the general public when it comes to disaster management.  
 
In an international context, K3 also brought up the issues of maladaptation in the Tohoku. The 
tsunami protection barriers gave people a false sense of security, and that had unintended 
consequences when the tsunami overrode the barrier, the informant said. The informant also 
talked about how New Orleans developed levees and pumps to protect the region from natural 
hazards, which also had unintended consequences from the disrupted sediment flows and 
decreased effectiveness of the natural barriers island. In addition, K3 talked about the 
importance of perception and explained it by giving nuclear wastewater as an example. If the 
government bleed that off slowly, the effects are small to negligible, but they can’t do it because 
of political reasons and opposition. The impact would be low compared to when a new disaster 
strikes and all of those tanks break, it’s going to be a “huge vulnerability”, the informant stated. 
K3 further explained that as an expert in the field, he avoids buying from the nuclear affected 
areas even when they had been cleared. K3 also mentioned that the general public was not 
aware of how hazardous (e.g. toxic ash) the waste is to human health and how a disaster such 
as flooding could have a flow-on effect from flooded chemical plants, for example. The 
informant also explained how there are standards for drinking water and almost everything, but 
not for ambient water, which is important for irrigation for rice paddies. In comparison to 
drinking water, ambient water for environmental services is behind in terms of value, 






“(The community) believed that seawalls were safe 
but the tsunami in Tohoku 2011 was much larger. 
Very similar reason why the people didn’t evacuate 
from the coastal region so quickly is because they 
believe in the kind of thing, where knowledge by 
the senior people and also they believe in the safety 
of seawall and tsunami guard walls and another 
thing is Japan Meteorological Agency… 
underpredicted the height of the tsunami… because 
this is really technical, we have some limitations to 
quickly estimate the size of the earthquake… that is 
another reason why the people didn’t evacuate 
quickly. That just makes tsunami damage much 
worse.” 
“Of course, we have to focus 
on the hardware, but also the 
issue is how quickly we can go 
back to the normal life.” 
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Table 5-7 The table below illustrates some of the key quotes on the importance of awareness and 
perceptions by K3. 
“(When developing strategies) have some thinking about disasters, can’t be day to 
day.” 
“One always has to look at the potential unintended consequence of protection 
measures, because they endangered our sense of security which leads to higher 
vulnerability.” 
“People’s livelihoods are based on perception… You shouldn’t underestimate the 
importance of perception.” 
“If I’m not (buying from the nuclear affected prefectures), and I have a degree from 
physics, and I know that the government cleared all those peaches, what about the less 
knowledgeable? Perception is really important, it’s not logic, government mandates 
and stuff only go so far.” 
 
 
Comments on community response  
 
C2 felt that it took NCTIR a bit of time to embed themselves into the Kaikōura community, 
but they inundated the area with opportunities and resources and utilised the local human 
resources for the rebuild projects. Correspondingly, K1 mentioned that the community 
response for NCTIR was positive at the initial stages when roads were being opened; and it 
was evident that NCTIR was driving the local economy in terms of accommodation and 
hospitality. K1 said however, that there had been a shift as the community is frustrated at the 
slow progress of the construction work. K2 also mentioned the shift in the community’s 
response due to the uncertainty of when the building works were wrapping up. In addition, K4 
also expressed that the community felt “done to them, rather than part of and having a say in 
(the recovery process)”. The informant said it was important to have a recovery manager that 
has links with the community and the national and regional level. The table below outlines 
some of the key comments to illustrate the community response in the reconstruction process 








Table 5-8 The table below summarises the key comments made by the informants on the community 
response in Kaikōura. 
Comments on community involvement  
C2 “So, as part of the recovery, it was important that we think about the economy of the region 
and utilise as many resources as we could (while keeping) the same economic injection into 
the region.” 
K1 “It’s explaining to the community, that even though it’s functional, there’s still stuff to finish, 
there’s still more things to do.” 
K4 “(Recovery Managers) have to be able to have relationships up in the ministry, and down 
with the people on the ground as well. Picking random people and throwing them in the deep 
end is a bit rough.” 
 
CS1 expressed disappointment with the council’s approach to recovery, and that good 
leadership is important to provide a platform for the community to raise their concerns. The 
informant also expressed dissatisfaction regarding community engagement. The informant 
observed that although there is a Facebook page, internet access is not available in a lot of 
areas. There is a high percentage of the community who are over 65, the rural context has to 
be taken into account when it comes to community engagement, the informant stated. In 
addition, CS1 raised the point that there should be more community workshops and that it 
should be a two-way thing, rather than the senior management staff “talking at people the whole 
time”.  
“We had the potential to get it really good, with the 
community in there, for the first time, being involved and 
wanting to shape their future… Some Christchurch 
development and commerce people, took our ideas, took 
them away, and created the Re-Imagine Kaikoura 
document, without any consultation with us who were 
working in the area… it doesn’t reflect what we wanted it 
to reflect… we can’t use it… Everyone’s crossed with us, 
and rightly so. I am too. We spent all this money, and we’ve 
got nothing to show for it.” CS1 
 
Similarly, C1 mentioned that the community felt “really disengaged with the council and very 
much done to”. C1 said however, despite their best efforts, that there’s always going to be a 
sector of the community that were disengaged due to technological constraints, which 
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exacerbates post-disaster (Figure 5-25). Likewise, CS3 said that the community felt like “things 
have been done to us, as opposed to being driven by the community”.  
 
Figure 5-25 The diagram above shows the comments made by C1 on post-disaster community 
engagement in Kaikōura.  
 
C4 gathered the community’s response towards the reconstruction project from the media and 
commented on the recreational and amenity areas regarding Iwi interests and public 
oppositions. C3 said it was a challenge communicating with the construction team regarding 
erosion and sediment control measures when there’s a giant slip that is dumping sediments into 
the ocean created by natural processes. Similarly, C5 mentioned that meeting the community’s 
expectation was a bit of a challenge, and the negative media coverage made matters worse. C2 
shared similar views to C5. Table 5-7 below illustrates the challenges with community 
engagement in Kaikōura.  
Table 5-9 The table below shows the comments on community engagement in Kaikōura by C2 and C4.  
C2 “It’s about listening and showing empathy to the community, put yourself in their shoes, 
but also trying to take them on the journey about why you’re doing certain things.”  
 “I think the challenges are meeting the expectations of the community.  and providing 
enough information to the community which gives and confidence that you are doing 
everything you can to  keep them safe and restore the situation. And I think in New Zealand 
as well the challenges define the resources quickly.  And when I say resources I mean 
capable and competent resources.” 




“(The community) felt 
like agencies are doing to 
rather than doing with.” 
“Social media targets one 
demographic, paper/newsletters 
target another. So, you can’t be 
everything to everyone, that’s just 
what life is” 
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A3 expressed similar views with C4 on the community response on protective barriers 
constructed in Japan. The informant mentioned that there had been a decrease in population in 
the affected areas, which meant that the towns and cities struggle to rebuild because of 
contacting issues. The government proposed memorial objects for the cities and towns, but “the 
people didn’t want to be reminded of anything”, the informant said.  
 
“Some people like the big tsunami walls to protect the 
town, but some people don’t like that, because they 
lose the nice view.” A3 
 
Comments on recovery structure   
 
In the Kaikōura context, C2 stated that they underestimated the amount of resources needed 
for community engagement, which has tripled ever since. The informant questioned if Civil 
Defence was the most suitable agency to set up the cauldrons during the time of a disaster. The 
control and operation of the cauldrons should be more of a defence force type of role who has 
got the specialist equipment and resources for the overall control and coordination of it, C2 
said. In addition, C4 felt like it would be more beneficial for the council to “be more involved 
and make more use of their local knowledge and their knowledge of local and community 
issues”. The felt like there were limited authority from the council in terms of the consenting 
process due to the nature of the project. Moreover, C3 brought up that they had to assess the 
consents three times because the designs were done too early on. C3 further mentioned that the 
community pressure overtook their assessment. The hierarchical nature of NCTIR meant that 
reporting would go up to the senior management staff where it would be responsible to report 
it back to NCTIR, rather than straight to NCTIR itself, the informant stated. The figure below 





Figure 5-26 The diagram shows the comments on the recovery structure by C3 and C4. 
 
As expressed by a few of the key informants, the recovery process in Kaikōura was heavily 
focussed on the reinstating the isolated corridor. There was a trade-off between quick physical 
restoration and environmental impact.   
 
“It just had to be done, because the 
priority was to get the road opened.” C4 
 
In an international context, K3 expressed that politics can come into play sometimes. The 
informant described that the input from United Nations can be dependent on the social context 
of a country, and within that, funders’ priorities come in to play. In addition, K3 talked about 
waste management in the community level in Japan. There are decontamination issues with 
solar panels at the moment, but possibly due to profitability, many old rice paddies near the 
train tracks have now been converted to house solar panels, the informant said.  
 
“Interactions with developing countries are partly 
political, but in most instances, demand driven… and 
we do our best to respond to them, but at the same 
time, we raise funds… which is a bit of a balancing 





“We were all aware of the 
cumulative effects… but actually, 
being cynical, it didn’t really 
matter at the end of the day… 
they knew there was a lot of 
community pressure there, that 
got a lot of attention in terms of 
the effect’s assessment.” C3 
“I think that council had very 
little opportunity to influence the 
process, at times, I think they 
would’ve been really helpful with 
providing information, because 
they worked there every day and 
they always have.”  C4
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Overall review  
Comments on local contexts  
 
Rather than standing on the legislation, K4 said that Civil Defence in Marlborough took a more 
prescriptive approach through community-led recovery. That was possible because of the 
Kaikōura Earthquake was relatively small scale, the informant said.  In addition, A1 raised the 
point of how the name of an earthquake can affect the recovery process. The informant 
described that due to the name of the earthquake, Kaikōura received more significant amount 
of aid compared to the other areas which were affected. Also, CS4 felt like New Zealand, a 
country that is as disaster prone, is “playing catch-up” when it comes to reduction works.  
 
“(Hurunui and Waiau) got a bit annoyed that 
Kaikōura was getting all the spotlight on them 
because it was the Kaikōura earthquake.” A1 
 
A1 and A3 talked about how culture comes into play for post-disaster management (Table 5-
8). A3 raised the point about how the general public is highly dependent on the government for 
information. On the other hand, A1 talked about how it is difficult to compare New Zealand 
and Japan because of the cultural difference. The informant described how culturally, New 
Zealand and Japan differ when it comes to government decisions. Significant community 
participation is possible in New Zealand because we have a smaller population in comparison. 
In Japan, because of the size of the country and the power of the government, they can step in 




Table 5-10 The table below shows the comments by A1 and A3 on how culture comes into play for post-
disaster management.  
Comments on influence of culture  
A1 “Japan is used to having government impose decisions on them, and they are quite 
willingly to have that happen… That would never happen here. I mean culturally, we are 
not that and we would not want stuff imposed on us.”  
 
A3 “This is the kind of Japanese mentality. People are dependent on the government. We call 
it Okami. It means imperial or upper state of the country could protect us.”  
 
 “Some cities have local or NGOs to make some kind of evacuation plan… but most of the 
case, they follow the rules given by the government.” 
 
Comments on waste management  
 
In the Tōhoku context, A2 commented on the streamlined structure for disaster waste 
management in Japan but expressed concerns about the landfill capacity. A2 also described 
how the market can play a role in disaster waste management as in the case of Sendai city, 
where metal wastes can sell for a significant amount of money because of the clear separation 
from the other waste materials. A2 explained how because the wastes were submerged in sea 
water, they contain sodium chloride and thus, making it difficult to incinerate as it causes 
corrosion to the incinerator. The informant also reflected on the turnover of government staff 
every 3 or 4 years, and how that knowledge is lost with the shift, however, A2 pointed out how 
the D-waste network aims to provide support for that. In addition, K3 mentioned how Japan’s 
solution to incineration is to make islands out of the ash produced, but that does not work for 
disaster waste as it requires a steady stream of high caloric waste.  
 
“Government staff change around every 3 or 4 years. 
Experienced people in particular sector got shifted 
around, then it is back to zero and we have to reconstruct 
the system again. But, D-Waste network supports the 





Comments on the monitoring process  
 
In the Tōhoku context, A3 pointed out that the monitoring was mainly managed by the local 
government and due to the large area, central government is not able to cover everything at the 
local level. The informant added though, that the local government have an obligation to report 
the recovery process back up to the central government as they provide funding. A3 also noted 
that the media plays a role as they expose the current recovery affairs and progress.  
 
In an international context, K3 talked about using technology like robots and drones for 
monitoring outcomes but raised the point that there is no long-term solution for disaster wastes. 
The informant further explained how nuclear plant waste has no long-term solutions in place 
due to legal reasons. K3 mentioned that monitoring is weak since project timeline is typically 
three to five years. The “impacts and outcome are much longer term” and due to finance and 
community engagement issues, there is a disconnect between the operational timescale; and 
the operational monitoring timescale presents a problem for monitoring, the informant stated. 
K3 questioned the value of monitoring and review though, and said it only add values if it has 
an impact on decision making.  
 
“We monitor spending, money, expenditure, 
procurement… and ask questions beyond the outputs 
and publish those. So, who cares? Who read it? We call 
it consideration for informed decision making. It only 
has an outcome or impact if a decision maker reads it, 
gets informed and takes the decision based of the 
knowledge in part of it… which can be monitored 
(through citations etc.)” K3 
 
In the Marlborough context, K4 raised the point that Kaikōura and Marlborough had a different 
monitoring system in place as Marlborough is a unitary authority whilst Kaikōura involves the 
regional and local councils to monitor the consented projects. This meant that monitoring is 
more streamlined and added to the database. It is important to have an “escape plan” for the 
recovery process though, and that things had to return to business as usual, which could be 
difficult to draw a threshold to the recovery process, the informant said. K4 explained that it is 
not to say that the psycho-social aspect won’t continue, but it is about going back to business 




Figure 5-27 The diagram above shows the comments by K4 on monitoring process in Marlborough. 
CS2 talked about the review that has been done on the recovery process and Kaikōura and said 
that they are still struggling for all the repairs and needed government help. The informant 
raised the point of marking an end to the recovery process. It could have continued, but when 
people are up and running, and there are signs of economic improvements with tourists coming 
in, and businesses buying new cars, it meant that the “time was up” and the town did not need 
a control recovery, the informant said. Furthermore, the informant reflected upon the recovery 
process in Kaikōura and talked about how it would be different in bigger cities. Marlborough 





“Our benefits were that 
we were doing all of that 
work. We were doing 
houses; we were also 
looking at environmental 
hazards… all in one visit.” 
“Reality is people 
have a lot of issues 
beforehand, we can’t 
say keep recovering 
until everyone’s well.” 
 90 
 
Figure 5-28 The diagram above shows the key quotes made by CS2 on the recovery process in Kaikōura.  
C2 described the monitoring process around the state of the assets in Kaikōura in terms of 
degree of damage before rebuilding. The informant said that this is to assess what the options 
were, and what were the problems needed to be fixed by developing a strategic business case. 
C2 added that the problem was that communities were disconnected as they were physically 
isolated and could not get access to the critical services and increased freight time.  
 
CS3 described that due to the small size of the Kaikōura District Council, Environment 
Canterbury (the regional council) does the monitoring for the consents and was able to 
duplicate the regional council consents as they were similar. The informant mentioned how 
with the Order in Council, the council was able to impose conditions on the consent 
applications where the applicants (NZTA or KiwiRail) could accept or reject those changes.  
 
“So, the conditions imposed on a consent were generic, 
and we were fortunate that the regional council, 
Environment Canterbury, has been pretty helpful in terms 
of monitoring consents and undertake multiple consents. 
Because effectively, unless we employ additional staff, we 
didn’t have the resources because of everything else that 
was occurring.” CS3  
 
Comments on the recovery process by CS2 
“Of course (the government grants) was 
never enough, we just want more, 
because we’ve got a small rates-based 
council.” 
“There had to be an agreement with your 
neighbouring county to cover for you.” 
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K1 talked about the partnership between the environmental team at NCTIR and Environment 
Canterbury for consent monitoring. Monitoring is time-consuming but that is “just part of the 
business” and it produces a more desirable outcome, the informant said.   
 
“At the end of the day, we all want the same thing… 
We don’t want to damage the environment… the 
animals or anything in the area.” K1 
 
Suggestions to managing future disasters  
 
At the end of the key informant interviews, the informants were asked for their perspectives 
to managing future disaster events. This section of the chapter thematically presents the 
measures recommended by the informants.  
 
A1 emphasised that disaster management is “really context specific” and described how 
resilience networks prior to the events determines the recovery and response process after a 
disaster. The informant also talked about “building a sense of community” and raising 
awareness on disaster management plays a key role in building resilient communities. 
Leadership is really important with issues like this, the informant said.  
 
“So, if you were in a well network community, and you 
know who the key people are, you know who the leaders 
are, you understand the disaster management 
arrangements, then, you’re much better off in the 
aftermath of an event like (Kaikōura).” A1  
 
Similarly, K3 explained that there is no definite answer for moving forward in terms of post-
disaster management. There are elements that could be identified, such as resilience for a city 
and patterns of vulnerability, but it is complicated, the informant said. There can be easy 
solutions like allocating space for large volume of disaster waste to ensure responder get access 
into the affected areas, and “a lot of places don’t do that”. Furthermore, K3 also mentioned that 
“people care about the outcome”, rather than who is in charge of the recovery process, whether 
it be the United Nations, NGOs, or government. K3 said it’s highly dependent on the country 
though, that some prefer the United Nations as it is perceived to be neutral. K3 brought up that 
their engagement is usually triggered top-down with bottom-up stakeholder engagement.  
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K4 said that even though the Civil Defence Group in Hurunui is small, the team do their best. 
We can be a bit stretched on the ground, but we are focussed on the important issues, the 
informant said. K4 described how the Hurunui District’s financial capability contributed to the 
recovery process in the region. There were disgruntled reactions amongst the community about 
the lack of support, but it was a trade of between being in charge of the recovery process and 
getting financial aid from the central government, the informant said. The informant described 
how Marlborough gave the message nationally that they were coping with the disaster, when 
in reality, they had higher repair bill than Kaikōura and Hurunui combined, but because they 
did not declare a state of emergency, they did not get as much support from the government 
due to the desire to be independent. K4 also mentioned that they had a relatively small focus 
on psycho-social recovery in Marlbourough.  
 
“Because our view, if you provide them with clean water, warm 
house, roof over their head, transport, food etc. That’s going to 
improve their mental wellness a lot more than hey, how would 
you like to have some free doctor’s visits… You can’t separate 
these things out.” K4 
 
K4 also mentioned how the actions in the response phase would affect the recovery phase. 
Appointing a recovery manager that “understands the whole picture” is also important. K4 also 
emphasised on the importance of investing in reduction programme, which is lacking at the 
moment.  The informant also expressed concerns for the affordability side of things for future 
disasters (Table 5-9). 
 
Table 5-11 The table below illustrates the key quotes made by K4 on the current post-disaster 
recovery structure framework. 
“There’s nobody thinking 6 months, 12 months out, people are just responding to 
what’s in front of them right now. Recovery starts on day 1. It’s just making sure 
decisions made aren’t affecting what’s going to happen in the next few years.”  
“We have enough experience in recovery, what works what doesn’t… But it’s the more 
in the reduction, the faster recovery will be.”  
“I think we have to look at how we do recover from these things if insurance companies 
start to bail.”  
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Conversely, C3 applauded the accelerated process the Order in Council brought in for the 
Kaikōura rebuild. The informants added that they felt it was important that ecological 
principles get captured into the Order in Council for other events. Similarly, C2 commented on 
the governance structure of the alliance and the different levels of interfaces to ensure clear 
responsibilities and roles and how things flow. CS2 also talked about having clear roles and 
responsibilities between the council staff and the recovery team. 
 
“I don’t think you could ever achieve a recovery in that 
time without breaking from the normal systems. You 
would still be consulting over things, wouldn’t you, 
even now.” C3  
 
K2 described how due to Kaikōura District Council being a small council, the rebuild 
management should have been outsourced and managed by an individual party to allow council 
to “focus on moving forward”. The informant also talked about how the delays in the rebuild 
could be attributed to the lack of skills and expertise within the council to manage a large-scale 
project involving concurrent infrastructural projects and restoring critical services like roads 
and water. K2 also felt like recovery team should have been kept separate from the council, 




“Now they are trying to do (recovery, rebuild work 
management and business as usual), without the expertise 
to do it or the manpower to do it effectively, and that is 
actually dissolving their ability to resolve as a council.” K2 
 
C5 brought up that the financial system needed a bit more attention at NCTIR. C5 also raised 
the point that the data collected on site should have been converted into database to provide 
more functionality and analytical values. There should also be standard process for the 
engineering assessments on the damage for future events, the informant said.  
 
“The construction industry is putting best financial 
people into NCTIR… but isn’t that detrimental for the 
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company you’ve taken them out of? I think you’ve got 
to make it incentivise enough to put key people in.” C5 
 
C2 also said to “be ready” for another major event, by having the system and process in place 
that “we can just pull out of the drawer and implement it as quickly as we can but have the 
resources that we can tap into quickly.” CS3 raised the point that a proactive approach through 
generic plans prior to the events with more generic support from the national government or 
having a group trained the specifically offer assistance to smaller councils would be beneficial.  
 
“I’m assuming you’d still have to go through that 
special legislation to fix roads again, to redo things, 
critical infrastructures, and you think, now we have to 
reinvent the wheel a little bit.” CS3 
 
In an international context, K3 highlighted that post-disaster management or preparation is 
thinking about the stochastic events and developing the capacity of the systems to handle those 
extreme events. It is also about involving the community and investing in reduction and 
preparedness measures, the informant stated. K3 also talked about improving resilience in 
different contexts regarding the type of disasters, the predictability and response of it, and the 
social contexts of the regions (Figure 5-29). Japan is able to cope with the disaster waste 
because they got the resources to distribute the waste nation-wide, which eased the pressure. 
However, for countries with limited resources, “technology don’t work in that context”, the 
informant said. This is because of maintenance and affordability issues. In those cases, K3 




Figure 5-29 The diagram above shows the comments made by K3 on how the social context comes into 
play for post-disaster management.   
In the Kaikōura context, K2 suggested that for post-disaster recovery, it is important that 
businesses are working collectively together. C2 also talked about supporting council around 
statutory tasks and activities as councils “normally run a pretty tight ship, fiscally, their budgets 
are pretty tight”, but there needs to be more support and investment for the community at the 
council’s part. C2 noted that people wanted follow-ups from navigators for door-knocking to 
check on them, to ensure that the they feel supported from a wellbeing perspective in terms of 
access to food, critical services like clean water and power. If they have not got those, they 
knew what options were available to them, the informant said. Furthermore, C2 raised the point 






“In a country that’s 
not able to move 
large amount of 
food around, (that 
makes it) highly 
vulnerable locally.” 
“You need the 
culture and 
knowledge and 
funds to maintain 
the technology.” 
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Table 5-12 The table below lays out the key comments made by C2 on the lessons learned from post-
disaster community engagement in Kaikōura.  
“So, my view is, you need to provide lots of information, and even if there’s no new 
information, you need to continue providing the same key messages to people.” 
 
“As we start mobilising, we’re able to give people confidence that we were flooding 
the area with resources, that we’re going to help them, that we were bringing in 
specialised plant in to assist the recovery.” 
 
“And the lesson there is that because we undercooked in the beginning, it took us a 
long time to recovery the confidence of the community.” 
 
 
CS1 emphasised on the importance of community connections and how that would benefit the 
recovery process (Figure 5-30). The informant also stressed the importance of localism for 
community and economic development. The informant described that in this structure, the local 
council would report up to the regional level by which they would their own research and 
organise the resources needed. CS1 said currently, they are trying to establish a community 
house where the key agencies are based out of to provide for community services in Kaikōura.  
 
 
Figure 5-30 The diagram above shows the comments made by CS1 on how to potentially manage future 





“If we strengthen these grass-roots 
things, we are so much better off in a 
disaster because we could just tap into 
those organisations and say what do you 
need, and then we can hustle with the 
people who know how to get stuff from 
the Central Government.” 
“It was locally-led, 
intermediately managed and 
nationally supported.” 
“Community connections on a 
grassroots level is key to 
resilience in peace time or 
disaster times.” 
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CS3 emphasised on the importance of having people in the community can trust, who can then 
act as a conduit between what’s happening at the local level and the national level. The 
informant praised that the local government works well as a conduit. It does not always work, 
but the local government does benefit by having a bit more ground as opposed to external 
agencies like NZTA or KiwiRail in a small community like Kaikōura’s, the informant said.   
 
C1 said “it’s easy to insult, but it’s hard to fix” but emphasised on the importance of community 
engagement and strategic approach for post-disaster management. The informant explained it 
through the fishery ban based on the Maui Dolphin Management Plan proposed, which they 
felt could heavily impact the fishing community in Kaikōura. The small population in Kaikōura 
meant that we didn’t have as much say in it, the informant said. In addition, the informant felt 
that the external council staff are lacking the local community knowledge as they are not part 
of the community. C1 further added that the recovery period should not have been in the 
legislation, as “you can’t draw a line on issues like that”. There needs to be a social, cultural 
and local environment introduced into the recovery legislation, the informant stated. This is 
reinforced by CS2, who emphasised that it was important to having local knowledge sitting 
alongside the external controllers and recovery managers. The informant also talked about 
having a database of businesses that the management staff could just tap into and to further the 
recovery process.  
 
“We need (external support), but you need that 
local knowledge, especially in a small town.” CS2 
 
Furthermore, K3 described how sometimes money and technology are not the issue for post-
disaster recovery, and social engagement comes into play. There could also be unintended 
consequences at the base level of society, where alternative livelihoods come into play, the 
informant said. K3 also talked about the importance of awareness and knowledge, planning 
and funding when it comes to post-disaster management. Figure 5-31 below shows some of the 




Figure 5-31 The diagram above shows the comments made by K3 on post-disaster management 
at a local level.  
 
CS1 brought up how that the recovery team was not fully supported by the council staff and 
had “no idea how council systems work”. The informant said that it was important to have a 
good information management system for the database. In addition, K1 emphasised on the 
importance of getting the community on board on what NCTIR was doing from the beginning. 
C4 said that it would be beneficial to have a council staff sitting alongside the consultants 
where they could “feed into the process more effectively” given that the council had limited 
time to influence the process.  
 
“Give the council more opportunity through the 
consenting process to comment on things because they 
are the ones who will have to live with the long-term 
solutions over the next decade.” C4  
 
 
Regarding the rebuild project in Kaikōura, C5 said it is important that the community focus on 
the good things that were happening, rather than dwelling on the bad press about the project. 






“Think about the 
impacts (of informal 
sectors) when you are 
putting in place any 
kind of strategies.” 
“Putting that 
knowledge in place 
in the right 
communities is a big 
challenge or gap.” 
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Table 5-11 The table below illustrates the key quotes by C5 on the community’s perception of the 
rebuild process in Kaikōura. 
“I hope people realise that it was a small component, yes, it could have been dealt 
differently, but (the community) needs to see the other stuff that we’re doing that was 
much better.”  
 
“It would have been nice if people knew about the things that were going on, but you 
can’t have everything.”  
 
“They knew that it was going as fast as it could, quite cool that it flipped. You got a 
bit of a Kaikōura bubble, you forgot that the rest of New Zealand don’t see it that way, 
but that’s how these things go.”  
 
 
In the Japanese context, A2 said that disaster waste storage space should be a bit more of a 
priority. A3 also mentioned that decisions are made by politicians and dependent on budget. 
There has to be geographical input and preparing infrequent might not be the best way.  
 
Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has illustrated a broad array of characteristics about the post-disaster recovery 
framework in Tōhoku and Kaikōura. The chapter began with a brief overview of the Tōhoku 
and Kaikōura region to provide context to the results. Both regions had overarching national 
management systems for the recovery process, namely the Reconstruction Agency in Tōhoku, 
and the North Canterbury Transport Infrastructure Recovery Alliance in Kaikoura. Amongst 
the results discussed, and of particular importance to the present study, was the effects of local 
context on the post-disaster recovery environment. The pros and cons of the post-disaster 
recovery framework were outlined with reference to the key informant interviews. 
Furthermore, the chapter outlined several solutions that each region has utilised to managing 
post-disaster situations. These included drawing on the available general resources and 
developing communication channels that were recognised to be effective in each region. On 
the contrary, the informants also provided details on the constraints that were preventing the 
implementation of those solutions, which included limitations to human and financial resources 
as well as the issues surrounding the communication measures. Overall, the informants have 
provided useful insights into the post-disaster legislative environments in each region and the 
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chapter concluded with suggestions by the informants to managing future post-disaster 
situations. In order to address the research questions proposed, the following chapter interprets 
these main findings and aims to evaluate the post-disaster recovery environment in Tōhoku 
and Kaikōura.  
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Chapter 6: Discussion  
 
This chapter has two primary objectives. Firstly, the main findings from the key informant 
interviews are interpreted and discussed with reference to the theoretical framework developed 
in Chapter 2. Secondly, this chapter assesses the meaning of the results against the research 
questions proposed. The research questions addressed in this chapter are:  
 
Research Question 1  Is post-disaster management in Japan the state of the art? 
  
Research Question 2  What are the gaps and challenges of post-disaster recovery 
management? Are there ways through which they could be 
filled?  
 
Research Question 3  What is the best step forward to managing post-disaster 
recovery efforts?  
 
Figure 6-1 demonstrates the key themes emerged from the findings of this research. It 
illustrates the intertwining relationship of the contextual factors, legislative environment, and 
the recovery structure. Due to the complex nature of the findings, this chapter is split into two 
sections. The first section investigates the effects of context on the post-disaster recovery 
environment. The second section explores the interlinking relationships between the contextual 
factors, recovery structure and the legislative environment.  
 
Figure 6-5 The diagram above illustrates the key themes that have emerged from the findings of the 
study. It shows the interlinking relationship between the contextual factors, legislative environment and 
the recovery structure. The recovery structure itself shapes the a list of factors which are also influenced 










Comparison issues  
 
 
This study sets out to evaluate post-disaster recovery frameworks in Japan and New Zealand. 
The first research question examines whether Japan is the leading country in terms of their 
approach to post-disaster recovery management. In order to address this question, a 
comparative study was carried out focusing on the recovery structures put in place after the 
Tōhoku earthquake in Japan and the Kaikōura earthquake in New Zealand. As previously 
mentioned, the two cases were selected based on their geographical and legislative similarities. 
Both Tōhoku and Kaikōura had national governance structures in place to assist with the 
recovery process. This had significant implications on the recovery structure in the respective 
Regions. The 2011 natural disaster in the Tōhoku Region of Japan was characterised by three 
catastrophes. The earthquake triggered a tsunami which devasted the Region and also led to a 
nuclear plant meltdown. The complexity and extent of the damage meant that high-level 
assistance was required to restore and revitalise the affected regions. Similarly, in the case of 
Kaikōura, a state of emergency was declared as the Council did not have the finances and 
general resources to cope with the disaster. As a result, a national governance structure was put 
in place to assist the Kaikōura district. The following subsections explores the effects of the 
contextual factors (e.g. geographic, cultural settings) on a post-disaster recovery environment.  
 
Contextual factors  
 
As the research developed, it became increasingly apparent that the comparative study 
presented some challenges because of the different contextual factors between Tōhoku and 
Kaikōura. Many informants have raised the importance of local context in a post-disaster 
recovery environment. This is because the local context appears to be a determining factor that 
shapes the recovery structure. The local context encompasses the social, economic, built and 
natural environments; and the contextual factors transpired from this study included social and 
economic settings, as well as the type and scale of events. These factors seem to be significant 
in influencing the level of assistance (national, regional, local, or international) required for the 
affected regions. This evidently suggests that local context is the common denominator for 
shaping the recovery framework in each region. This is supported by several informants, who 
commented on how the sheer scale of events triggered a need for a national government 
support, meaning a national governance structure was put in place to assist with the recovery 
efforts in each region.  
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The cultural differences of Japan and New Zealand appears to be one of the contextual issues 
for the comparative study. It seems that the underlying difference of the cultural context lie 
within community participation. To illustrate, with a governance structure, the government can 
impose decisions on the community. The legislative environment can be highly prescriptive 
and can define the extent of community participation. The extent to which communities can 
influence the decision-making process seems like a differentiating factor between the 
governance structure in Japan and New Zealand. As mentioned above, the legislative 
environment in Tōhoku and Kaikōura both followed a top-down approach. However, the 
translation of the centralised structures to affected communities are starkly different.  
 
The Japanese communities appear be more compliant to the regulations than New Zealand 
communities. This may be due to the fact that, culturally, New Zealanders are not used to 
having decisions being imposed on them. To put that into context, the Japanese community 
had mixed review in relation to the delayed progress of the Tōhoku reconstruction efforts. As 
mentioned by informant A3, the Tōhoku community felt like the amount of support from the 
national government coincides with their economic contribution at the national level. It was 
suspected that the Tōhoku recovery process would have received a significantly higher level 
of financial assistance towards the recovery process if the region had more economic 
significance at the national level, as exemplified below:  
 
“Because if (the Tōhoku Earthquake) happened in Osaka 
or Tokyo, they would make the recovery process quick, 
it’s related to the economic heart of Japan” A3 
 
Conversely, the Kaikōura community expressed certain degree of dissatisfaction with the 
governance structure that was in place. There was some frustration with the slow progress, but 
it looks as if the main issue the informants had was with the governance structure in place. For 
instance, informant CS1 compared the recovery structure between Kaikōura and Hurunui. The 
informant expressed dissatisfaction with the rigorous recovery structure in Kaikōura. There 
were obligations that the local council had to meet as part of the national governance support, 
and the informant argued that it substantially hindered the recovery process. According to 
informant CS1, Hurunui was allowed more flexibility in their disaster recovery and recovered 
a lot faster than Kaikōura did.   
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A mixed response with the recovery progress in the Tōhoku region was observed, but unlike 
Kaikōura, there was no apparent indication of frustration towards the top-down management 
system. This is highlighted by informant A3, who described the idea of “okami”, meaning 
relying and trusting the government. This evidently suggests that local-level processes in Japan 
were heavily influenced by high-level governmental decisions. Informant A1 reinforced the 
notion and stated that the Japanese community is accustomed to having government impose 
decisions on them. As informant A1 explained, this would not happen in New Zealand, as 
culturally, New Zealanders do not appreciate having decisions imposed on them by the 
government. It is normally assumed that New Zealand could afford extensive community 
participation because of its small population, however, the findings illustrate how culture plays 
a big part in post-disaster recovery, as suggested by this comment by informant A1:  
  
“Japan is used to having government impose decisions on 
them, and they are quite willingly to have that happen… 
That would never happen here. I mean culturally, we are 
not that and we would not want stuff imposed on us.”  
 
Monitoring difficulties  
 
Another issue with the comparative study is difficulties with the monitoring process. 
Monitoring the outcomes of a recovery process allows an understanding of the recovery 
structure, and thus, providing indications to the effectiveness of a post-disaster recovery 
structure (Brown et al., 2015). However, as raised by several informants, there were many 
complications involved with the monitoring process for the Tōhoku and Kaikōura regions. This 
poses a question to the value of comparing the post-disaster recovery structures of the two 
regions. The informants listed many geographical and logistical difficulties when it comes to 
the monitoring process, which many of these problems appear to be related to financial and 
community engagement issues (K3). As indicated by informant A3, the large scale of the event 
may mean that it would not be feasible to cover the extent of the damage from the disaster. 
Furthermore, there appears to be a disconnect between the operational and monitoring 
timescale. According to informant K3, a project timeline typically ranges around three to five 
years, however, the effects and outcomes of a project are usually presented on a much longer 
timescale. The interpretation of these findings suggests that monitoring is difficult to achieve, 
and as reinforced by informant K3, there are no long-term solutions for monitoring situation. 
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Moreover, monitoring outputs would be worthwhile only if it had impacts on the decision-
making level (K3).  
 
Implications of contextual factors and monitoring difficulties on the comparative study 
between Tōhoku and Kaikōura  
 
The findings evidently suggest that a comparative study would not be the most effective 
platform to illustrate the merits of a post-disaster recovery framework. This may be due to the 
interlinking relationship between disaster recovery and resilience networks. According to 
informants A1 and K3, the level of resilience in a community determines the quality of the 
recovery process. There are patterns of vulnerability and resilience characteristics that can be 
captured as to the effectiveness of a post-disaster recovery process. This resonates with the 
findings of Strunsińska-Correria (2017), who recognised the functions of social elements in a 
post-disaster recovery environment. These observations suggest the heavy correlation between 
the contextual factors and the success of the recovery process.  
 
In regard to the discussion above (which was articulated with reference to the national 
governance structure for post-disaster recovery efforts), a national governance structure 
provides vast amount of financial and human resources and accelerate the reconstruction 
process. It also allows cross-sectoral integration and partnerships, thus, providing another 
source of resources to the affected communities (Kwok et al., 2016). The importance of 
partnerships resonated in the findings from the informant interviews and the literature. It is 
vital as this collaboration plays a significant role in providing a platform for data exchange in 
a post-disaster recovery situation (Godschalk et al., 1999). Many informants have highlighted 
the significance of establishing effective communication channels at the local, regional and 
national level (A1; C2; CS1; K4). This parallels with strengthening and forming relationships 
amongst the key stakeholders (Karunansean and Amaratunga, 2016; Hatton et al., 2017). 
However, as mentioned by Becken and Hughney (2013) and Kwok et al. (2016), establishing 
relationships requires sound leadership and coordination. This is reinforced by informant K4, 
who emphasised on the role of stakeholder relationships in post-disaster management, as 
exemplified below:  
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“If you haven’t got good relationships before it 
turns to mud, trying to develop relationships in a 
middle of a crisis, it’s a nightmare crisis, don’t ever, 
and really test good relationships sometimes.” K4 
 
However, as identified by K4, there was a trade-off between flexibility for the recovery process 
and the resource influx when it comes to having a governance structure. The informant raised 
the point that the national governance structure provided general resources into the affected 
regions, but it also meant that there would be a more rigorous structure in place for the recovery 
process at the local level. Moreover, the informants had competing views on the governance 
structure for the recovery process in Kaikōura. The informants had described that the recovery 
process in Kaikōura was different to the recovery process in Marlborough. Marlborough did 
not declare a state of emergency and had a locally-led recovery structure as a consequence. 
This poses the question of whether having a governance structure is the most effective approach 
to managing post-disaster situations and raises the intriguing possibility that the very structures 
designed for recovery may at times impeded recovery.  The following subsection will discuss 
the pros and cons of having a national governance structure for post-disaster recovery 
management with reference to the contextual factors, legislative framework and the recovery 
structure in Tōhoku and Kaikōura.  
 
Pros and Cons of having a governance structure  
 
Many informants commented on the trade-offs within the governance structure regarding the 
post-disaster recovery process. Some of these compromises were between the speed and time 
pressure and how it affects the environmental outcome (Figure 6-2). Some informants argued 
that the reconstruction processes were accelerated by having a national governance structure 
(C3; C4; C5; K1). In the case of Kaikōura, the structure contributed to a more streamlined and 
truncated consenting process. However, it also meant that there was a time pressure on the 
consenting process, which led to minimal environmental assessments as a consequence (C3; 
C4). This led to concerns in regard to the long-term environmental outcome under the national 
governance structure. Informants C3 and C4 felt that the environmental assessment was “more 
of a box-ticking process”. Likewise, informants C2 and C5 reinforced the element of time 
pressure and that it altered the normal proceedings of managing a construction project. These 
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observations suggested that there was a need to balance short-term benefits with long-term 
environmental impacts (CS3; CS4; C4), as exemplified below:   
 
“I wouldn’t call it environmental recovery of 
such, it’s just construction really, and 
management of ecological effects during 





Figure 6-6 The diagram shows the trade-off of 
having a national governance structure. Having a 
governance structure provides a platform for an  
accelerated recovery process. However, this 
means that there is a time constraint to the 





Figure 6-2A The diagram above illustrates the 
trade-off of having a national governance 
structure. A national governance structure gives 
power to the Recovery Manager and offer 
resources to the affected communities. However, 
this also means a lack of local voice as a result.  
 
Similarly, Figure 6-2A presents the trade-offs between statutory power and community 
concerns. According to informants CS1 and C1, the national governance structure inundated 
the affected regions with economic opportunities and general resources. In Kaikōura, the access 















the findings of Singh and Wilkson (2008) and Chang et al. (2011) who recognised resource 
availability as a critical driving force for the success of post-disaster recovery. In addition, the 
governance structure provided a platform for coordination of resources as well as the flow of 
vital information in a post-disaster recovery environment. This was reflective of the provisions 
outlined in the policy and planning document review in Chapter 3. As supported by Jensen 
(1998), these provisions appear to have been central to creating an effective post-disaster 
recovery environment. Furthermore, the governance structure created statutory powers needed 
to assist the recovery process (CS2). However, several informants have argued that this top-
down management approach led to a lack of community voice in the post-disaster recovery 
environment. In reality, communication measures were unsatisfactory in Kaikōura and do not 
seem to be not reflective of the provisions evaluated in Chapter 3 (CS1; C1; C2). This is 
reinforced by informant CS4, where the informant indicated the fragility of the legislative 
barriers, as exemplified below: 
 
“There’s things I’d say a lot of the senior management 
staff got really good of not communicating well with the 
public, and the elective members are hearing a very 
diluted truth and I don’t feel like they know what’s exactly 
going on. There’s been a COMS team put together at the 
council, but I feel like less information is coming out than 
ever before, and it’s all very sanitised.” C1  
 
The findings of Lawson et al. (2018) advised incorporating insights gained from previous 
experiences into post-disaster management. This was reflective in the findings from the 
informant interviews, where informants C5 and C2 both recalled the benefits of prior disaster 
experiences and described how that was a vital element in the recovery process in Kaikōura. 
This was also reinforced by informants A3 and K3, who revealed that there was a need to 
transfer this knowledge into the community level, as evident in the maladaptation of protection 
barriers in the Tōhoku region. These observations suggest a link between planning issues and 
the impact of the natural hazards. As described by the informants, there appears to be an 
intertwining relationship between awareness level and recovery process. It seems that the level 
of awareness influences the planning processes. The planning processes in turn correlates with 
the level of preparedness of a community, thus, affecting the quality of recovery after a disaster 
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(Figure 6-3). This resonated with the findings of Jensen (1998), who recognised the association 
of level of preparedness with post-disaster recovery.  
  
 
Figure 6-7 The diagram above illustrates the relationship between awareness level; planning 
processes; preparedness; and recovery. It has become apparent that awareness level influences the 
planning processes, which in turn, influences the level of preparedness, all these combined, influences 
the recovery process.  
 
Additionally, perception is another factor emerged from the informant interviews. There were 
varying perceptions regarding the quality of the recovery process. Informants K3 and C5 both 
quantified its role in influencing the recovery process with regard to nuclear contaminated 
products and community response towards media respectively. Several informants had 
competing views regarding the length of the recovery period in Kaikōura. Informants C1 and 
CS1 both argued that the recovery support from the national government was too short-lived 
to have made a lasting positive impact to the community; while informants CS2 and K4 
emphasised on the importance of an escape plan, and stated that a threshold was needed to be 
drawn to allow effective recovery of the affected communities. To summarise the importance 
of perception, the comment by informant C5 is outlined below: 
 
“I hope people realise that it was a small component, yes, it could 
have been dealt differently, but (the community) needs to see the 











Chapter Summary  
 
The findings presented in the informant interviews accentuates the significance of community 
engagement and education. This is due to the fact that the level of awareness affects the post-
disaster recovery environment (Jensen, 1998). According to informant K3, this is a major gap 
in post-disaster management. This resonated with the findings of Jensen, 1998 and Kwok et al. 
(2016), who identified the correlating relationship between the level of awareness and level of 
preparedness. This is reinforced by informants CS4 and K4. The informants recommended 
investments in pre-disaster risk reduction measures that develops the resilience of the local 
communities. This increase in resilience would minimise the adverse impacts of a disaster 
(Hatton et al., 2017), as suggested by the comment below:   
 
“Putting that knowledge in place in the right 
communities is a big challenge or gap.” K3 
 
In addition, the results of the study have revealed that flexibility in the governance structure is 
not the sole factor in providing a successful recovery outcome. There are clearly advantages 
and some disadvantages to a national governance structure (Figure 6-4). As described above, 
a national governance structure presents several trade-offs regarding statutory power, 
communication channels, environmental outcomes, rate of reconstruction and general 
resources. In contrast, the flexibility of recovery structure allows a focus at the local level. This 
evidently suggests that contextual factors have equal influence on the recovery process. There 
was an initial assumption that financial capability was a prominent factor when it comes to 
post-disaster recovery. However, the findings from the informant interviews have 
demonstrated other limiting factors in the social and logistical context such as cultural 
differences and monitoring difficulties, of which of those have been discussed above.  
 
In light of the findings of the study, it is recognised that the post-disaster recovery framework 
is highly interconnected to the contextual factors, the legislative environment and the recovery 
structure. There is no such thing as a ‘perfect recovery’, but an effective recovery framework 
exhibits a quality of adaptability. This can be achieved by introducing an adaptable emergency 
legislation that incorporates the contextual factors and encompasses elements of localism. On 
the contrary, this necessitates significant amount of support and general resources, and there 
are several issues in relation to monitoring processes and community engagement. Thus, it 
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illustrates the complexity of managing a post-disaster situation and clearly suggests a research 
gap in the study. 
 
 
Figure 6-4 The diagram above illustrate the pros and cons of a national governance structure. The 
presence or absence of a national governance structure has significant implications, as illustrated by 
the difference in  the recovery process between Marlborough and Kaikōura. 
 
This chapter has presented interpretations of the main findings from the informant interviews 
and the paper-based review. The first section of the chapter addressed the Research Question 
1 by exploring the importance of the contextual factors in a post-disaster recovery setting. The 
latter section tackled Research Question 2 and 3 through a detailed analysis of the recovery 
frameworks in Tōhoku and Kaikōura. The chapter concludes with remarks of the complex task 



















x Regulated lines of communication (CS1; A1) 
x Light focus on social, cultural and 
environmental aspects (C1; C3; C4; CS3) 
x Time constraints (C2; C3; C4; C5; CS3) 
 
x Lack of financial input (CS1; C1) 
x Little external support (C1; A1) 
 
x Quick consent process (CS2; CS3; C3; C4; C5; K1)  
x Funding (CS1) 
x Human resources (C1) 
x Statutory Power (CS2) 
x Recovery Structure (C2;C3) 
 
x Grassroot recovery (CS1) 




Chapter 7: Conclusions  
 
Post-disaster recovery planning coordinates the efforts to recover from the physical, social and 
economic repercussions in a medium to long-term time scale. It involves the built, natural, 
social and economic environment. This research has explored the topic of post-disaster 
recovery efforts through two case studies; Kaikōura Earthquake in New Zealand and Tōhoku 
Earthquake in Japan. These case studies were selected as both locations are experiencing 
significant risks from natural hazards, and a comparative study would contribute to improving 
post-disaster management in New Zealand. The findings of this research concluded with 
recommendations of factors to be considered to managing post-disaster recovery efforts.  
 
Key findings  
 
This thesis set out to evaluate the post-disaster recovery framework in Tōhoku and Kaikōura. 
The motivation of this research was to identify whether disaster management could be 
improved in New Zealand.  
 
This study revealed that a comparative study of the post-disaster recovery framework between 
Tōhoku and Kaikōura is a complex undertaking because of the interlinking relationship 
between the contextual factors, legislative environment and the recovery structure. Post-
disaster management is highly context-specific. In this case, it encompasses the social, 
geographical and logistical contexts. This consists of a variety of aspects, including the cultural 
setting, geographical setting, and the economic setting. The informants have provided key 
insights into the contextual factors and discussed the effects of these factors on the post-disaster 
recovery environments in each region. The observations from the findings have suggested that 
the reason for the issue with the comparative study may be due to the interlinking relationship 
between post-disaster recovery and community resilience. It evidently suggested that the these 
social elements shaped the post-disaster recovery environment.  
 
As the research developed, it was also observed that the national governance structure in place 
for the recovery process in Tōhoku and Kaikōura each had some advantages and some 
disadvantages. The national governance structure seemed to have provided a steady influx of 
general resources and support to the affected communities and accelerate the recovery process. 
It also provided statutory powers necessary to assist in the recovery process. However, as 
 113 
mentioned by the informants, the time pressure with the rebuild project meant that there was a 
light focus at the local-level in terms of the social, cultural and environmental aspects. 
Communication channels were seemingly regulated as mentioned by the informants. This is of 
importance as post-disaster recovery is heavily reliant on local level participation, and it seems 
like the national governance structure followed a top-down management approach, as opposed 
to being bottom-up.  
 
The informant findings and paper-based review have suggested that community engagement is 
the key to managing post-disaster situations and the higher level of preparedness, the quicker 
the recovery process. On the contrary, as several informants suggested, some of the elements 
in the disaster triggered the need for a top-down management approach. This included the scale 
of the events, the type of the events, general resource capacity and capability of the affected 
area, and the cultural beliefs of the communities. Again, this is where the contextual factors 
comes in, in particular, cultural differences and funnelling through all these factors, it became 
apparent that a generic emergency legislative environment may be one of the solutions to 
managing future post-disaster events. This emergency environment may presents elements of 
top-down management to provide structure and support to the affected communities, but it also 
consists of bottom-up mechanisms and incorporates the local level values regarding the social, 
physical, natural and built environment.  
 
Reflections and avenues for future research  
 
This research had contributed to a detailed understanding of a post-disaster recovery 
framework regarding the contextual factors, legislative environment and the recovery structure. 
As mentioned above, the findings from the informant interviews and document review 
evidently suggests the intertwining relationship between a broad array of factors. This posed 
as a challenge to the study, but it was also reflective of the complex nature of a post-disaster 
recovery environment. Considering the findings of the research in Tōhoku and Kaikōura, this 
research has also recommended factors to be taken into account in a post-disaster environment. 
The case studies have demonstrated that while quite different in terms of reconstruction scale, 
spatial size, economic and cultural backgrounds, challenges to post-disaster management 




The research was is constrained by being based on only two case studies, both with national 
governance recovery structures. The strength of this research however, is that the underlying 
principles of post-disaster recovery management can be applied to any other setting. In 
addition, broadening the scope of the research to include those principles, such as social 
contexts and community participation would provide useful insights into post-disaster recovery 
management. Further research within the timeframe was not feasible, and future research could 
be conducted on a wider scale. There is the potential to explore in more in-depth detail in 
relation to encouraging community participation and raising level of awareness on post-disaster 
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Appendix 1: Information Sheet for research in Japan  
 
 




[Reference Number: as allocated upon approval by the Human Ethics Committee] [Date] 
 
POST-DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS  
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate, 
we thank you.  If you decide not to take part, there will be no disadvantage to you, 
and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? The aim of the research is to identify where 
improvements can be made to disaster management. This project is being undertaken as part of the 
requirements for the Master of Planning Programme at the University of Otago. 
What Type of Participants are being sought? The research seeks to gather the perspectives of 
government officials and key stakeholders involved in the recovery projects around the Tōhoku Region. 
Participants for this project will be people who can offer key insights into the post-disaster recovery 
efforts around Tōhoku.  
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked 
to participate in semi-structured interview, either as an individual or as part of a group. You will be 
asked questions on the topics of planning and regulations in terms of disaster management, post-
disaster recovery efforts and community responses. Interviews are expected to take around 30 minutes 
and should not exceed the duration of 1 hour. The interviews will be audio recorded. If at any stage 
you feel uncomfortable, you may decline to answer any question, or request that the interview be 
terminated. Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? Information about post-
disaster management in Japan will be collected. If you agree, the interviews will be audio recorded to 
assist the researcher in interpreting the provided information. The results of the project may be 
published but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity should you choose to remain 
anonymous. Raw data will be kept in secure storage for at least 5 years before destroyed. If you are 
interested, you can also receive a copy of the completed thesis. 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? You may withdraw from 
participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. You may 
also request to view a transcript of your interview up until September 30, 2019 and may request that 
something that you said during the interview be not used in the thesis or subsequent publications. 
What if Participants have any Questions? If you have any questions about our project, either now or 
in the future, please feel free to contact either:- 
Zheng Lee and  Professor Sean Fitzsimons 
School of Geography   School of Geography  
E: leezh160@student.otago.ac.nz  P: +64 21 279 8786 
   E: sean.fitzsimons@otago.ac.nz  
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of 
the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome. 
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POST-DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I 
am free to request further information at any stage. 
 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project before its completion (specify a date if necessary); 
 
3. Personal identifying information [audio recordings] may be destroyed at the conclusion of the 
project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure 
storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes 
post-disaster management in Japan. The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have 
not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops and 
that in the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the 
project without any disadvantage of any kind. 
 
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity, should I 
choose to remain anonymous.  
 
6. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research,  OR;  
 
  b) would rather remain anonymous 
 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Name of person taking consent 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of 
the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 




Appendix 3: Information sheet for research in New Zealand  
 




[Reference Number: as allocated upon approval by the Human Ethics Committee] [Date] 
 
POST-DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS  
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet 
carefully before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate, 
we thank you.  If you decide not to take part, there will be no disadvantage to you, 
and we thank you for considering our request.   
 
What is the Aim of the Project? The aim of the research is to identify where 
improvements can be made to disaster management. This project is being undertaken as part of the 
requirements for the Master of Planning Programme at the University of Otago. 
What Type of Participants are being sought? The research seeks to gather the perspectives of 
government officials and key stakeholders involved in the recovery projects around the Tōhoku Region. 
Participants for this project will be people who can offer key insights into the post-disaster recovery 
efforts around Tōhoku.  
 
What will Participants be Asked to Do? Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked 
to participate in semi-structured interview, either as an individual or as part of a group. You will be 
asked questions on the topics of planning and regulations in terms of disaster management, post-
disaster recovery efforts and community responses. Interviews are expected to take around 30 minutes 
and should not exceed the duration of 1 hour. The interviews will be audio recorded. If at any stage 
you feel uncomfortable, you may decline to answer any question, or request that the interview be 
terminated. Please be aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
 
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? Information about post-
disaster management in Japan will be collected. If you agree, the interviews will be audio recorded to 
assist the researcher in interpreting the provided information. The results of the project may be 
published but every attempt will be made to preserve your anonymity should you choose to remain 
anonymous. Raw data will be kept in secure storage for at least 5 years before destroyed. If you are 
interested, you can also receive a copy of the completed thesis. 
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? You may withdraw from 
participation in the project at any time and without any disadvantage to yourself of any kind. You may 
also request to view a transcript of your interview up until September 30, 2019 and may request that 
something that you said during the interview be not used in the thesis or subsequent publications. 
What if Participants have any Questions? If you have any questions about our project, either now or 
in the future, please feel free to contact either:- 
Zheng Lee and  Professor Sean Fitzsimons 
School of Geography   School of Geography  
E: leezh160@student.otago.ac.nz  P: +64 21 279 8786 
   E: sean.fitzsimons@otago.ac.nz  
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of 
the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 
gary.witte@otago.ac.nz). Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated and you will be informed of the outcome. 
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POST-DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN 
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I 
am free to request further information at any stage. 
 
I know that:- 
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary; 
 
2. I am free to withdraw from the project before its completion (specify a date if necessary); 
 
3. Personal identifying information [audio recordings] may be destroyed at the conclusion of the 
project but any raw data on which the results of the project depend will be retained in secure 
storage for at least five years; 
 
4.  This project involves an open-questioning technique. The general line of questioning includes 
post-disaster management in Japan. The precise nature of the questions which will be asked have 
not been determined in advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops and 
that in the event that the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or 
uncomfortable I may decline to answer any particular question(s) and/or may withdraw from the 
project without any disadvantage of any kind. 
 
5. The results of the project may be published and will be available in the University of Otago Library 
(Dunedin, New Zealand) but every attempt will be made to preserve my anonymity, should I 
choose to remain anonymous.  
 
6. I, as the participant: a) agree to being named in the research,  OR;  
 
  b) would rather remain anonymous 
 
 
I agree to take part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................   ............................... 








Name of person taking consent 
 
This study has been approved by the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee. If you have any concerns about the ethical conduct of 
the research you may contact the Committee through the Human Ethics Committee Administrator (ph +643 479 8256 or email 




Appendix 5: Interview questions  
 
Drafted potential questions for interviews:  
 
[Legislative environment]  
1. What is your role?  
2. What do you think about the current regulatory framework around post-disaster 
management?  
3. How do you feel about the current reconstruction model?  
 
[Community response and communication measures]  
4. What do you think about communication between the council and stakeholders 
involved in post-disaster management?   
5. What do you think about the community engagement and involvement regarding post-
disaster reconstruction efforts? 
6. How do you feel about the community response towards the reconstruction efforts?  
7. How do you feel about the monitoring and reviewing system in place?  
 
[Suggestions on way forward]  
8. What do you think are the challenges or barriers? 
9. What do you see council’s role as being in managing the post-disaster reconstruction 
efforts into the future?  
10. What do you think would be the best step forward to managing post-disaster recovery 
efforts?  
 
 
